Barry Sheerman: Will my hon. Friend not only include data on university fees but trumpet the success of variable fees, which have delivered to universities a new stream of income and made it possible to employ and pay university teachers well? They have been an absolute success story, which is admired by countries all over the world.

Gordon Brown: As confirmed yesterday, growth in 2006 was, as the Government forecast, 2.7 per cent. Exports are rising at a rate of 4.5 per cent. a year, investment by 5 per cent. a year and business investment by more than 8 per cent. I call on work forces in the public sector to recognise that discipline on pay settlements, founded on our inflation target of 2 per cent., will be central to stable and sustained growth in the future.

Vincent Cable: When the Chancellor was in India, did he notice that one thing we have in common with that country—apart from steady and respectable rates of economic growth—is an utterly abysmal infrastructure, as we were all reminded yesterday? How do the Government and the Chancellor propose to achieve the very high level of investment in British transport infrastructure that will be required, given that the debt to GDP ratio he has set is already very close to the 40 per cent. limit?

Gordon Brown: The most damaging thing we could do in terms of the stability of the economy would be to adopt a fiscal rule that would require us to cut public expenditure by £18 billion tomorrow. Conservative Members would have to explain to their constituents about the schools and hospitals that they were closing and the nurses and teachers whom they were laying off. We will continue with our prudent management of the economy, and that includes restructuring the reserves of the economy in such a way that we are not dependant on one volatile item.

Gordon Brown: I look forward to continuing interventions from the hon. Gentleman while I hold the position of Chancellor. Almost every other country has done exactly what we have been doing to restructure and rebalance our reserves. It is the right thing to do; it is right not to be dependant on one volatile currency. The results were tested by the National Audit Office and it said that it was the right decision, and represented value for money. If I had taken the hon. Gentleman's advice, which he gave me very forcefully—indeed, even more forcefully in 1997—I would not have made the Bank of England independent; he said that that would lead to deflation, unemployment and ruin for the British economy. The opposite has happened.

Ian Austin: The spending review will be the next opportunity to demonstrate how increased investment and public service reform can strengthen our public services and the economy. Will the Minister meet a delegation from the black country to examine proposals for spending review investment that will boost skills, improve the transport network, reclaim brownfield sites and provide more housing, all of which support the Government's economic priorities? Can I also ask him to confirm that—

Bernard Jenkin: It is undoubtedly true that the very dramatic increases in public expenditure have increased the inflationary pressures in the economy as well. Since the Chancellor has twice today reminded the House that we had reservations about the independence of the Bank of England, may I remind him that we had reservations about the proposals that he tabled in the Bank of England Bill because the Bank would not be independent enough?  [Interruption.] Oh yes, it is true. We proposed longer term limits for the Monetary Policy Committee. Is it not now time to strengthen its independence, so that it can no longer be interfered with by the Chancellor?

Stephen Timms: Let me remind the right hon. Gentleman that International Monetary Fund said that "macroeconomic stability remains remarkable". I suggest that he looks at what interest rates were when he was a member of the Government. They were sky high, repossessions took place on an enormous scale and unemployment was also high. The claimant count has fallen for three months in a row and growth is at a higher level than we and others were expecting. We are determined to ensure that that impressive record continues.

Dawn Primarolo: HMRC's trust statement and the Comptroller and Auditor General's standard report on its accounts for 2005-06 show that, in total, £1 billion of overpayments had been recovered by 5 April 2006.

Jeremy Hunt: What would the Minister say to my constituent Mr. Roy Taylor, whose tax credit payments were stopped in August following a typing mistake by officials? He was told about the mistake but still received a repayment demand of more that £1,000. Is the system so flawed that officials send out repayment demands even when they know that they have made a mistake? That has caused enormous distress to my constituent, and to many other people in similar circumstances.

Dawn Primarolo: No. I am not sure what message the hon. Lady wants to send out. Is it that if a couple are overpaid and do not want to pay back their tax credits, they should split up? [Hon. Members: "No".] There is a serious question about the application for tax credits when it is made by a couple. Some circumstances warrant further attention on policy grounds. I confirmed that I was doing my best to look at that. The hon. Lady has a cheek to raise a question on joint and several liability when her party, when in government, introduced it for the poll tax. Let us remember that two signatures go on the forms, the application is jointly made and the tax credits are jointly paid. If they are overpaid, they must be recovered.

Sally Keeble: May I point out the important linkage between the tax-credit-paid child care, the higher level Child Trust Fund and Healthy Start vouchers, which have been well received. Whatever the problems of overpayment, they are vastly outweighed by the important practical help that tax credits and their link benefits have provided to some of my most needy constituents.

Edward Balls: I am happy to do so. My right hon. Friend has worked on the issues over many years, especially with our hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, North and Fleetwood (Mrs. Humble) on the parliamentary hearings that were innovative and pioneering and involved Members on both sides of the House, as well as parents. Some important stories were told during those hearings and they gave rise to some important policy recommendations.
	I can assure my right hon. Friend that when it comes to the final publication of the review, we will set out clearly in our document every recommendation he makes and show case by case and issue by issue how we will respond. I hope that we will able to respond to a number of recommendations made in the hearings in a way that gives hope and some certainty of improved services in the future to the families of disabled children.

Julie Kirkbride: What can the Economic Secretary offer in terms of hope or advice to my constituent, Mrs. Liz Brunt, who was very encouraged by the Government's document "Every Child Matters", but who finds that now that her learning disabled son has left school, there are no opportunities for meaningful activity or work because the services are not there to provide them?

Theresa May: I thank the Leader of the House for giving us the future business.
	Last week, I raised with the Leader of the House the question of the arrangements for Public Bill Committees. To ensure that the new procedures run as smoothly as possible, will he confirm that responsibility for deciding evidence sessions and witnesses should rest with the Programming Sub-Committee of the Public Bill Committee, and that the Public Bill Committee can take oral evidence at any time during the Committee stage of the Bill? Also, I understand that it has been proposed that there should be two weekends between the meeting of the Programming Sub-Committee and the first meeting of the Public Bill Committee, to give time for witnesses to be called. Sadly, that is not happening with the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill. Will he confirm that that two-weekend separation should be the norm?
	May we have a statement on the cost overruns on the Olympics? I have raised this matter before. On 6 July 2005, in response to a question from the hon. Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable), the Leader of the House, who was then Foreign Secretary, said:
	"the financial systems that are being put in place will be robust, as has been the planning that has already been done."—[ Official Report, 6 July 2005; Vol. 436, c. 416.]
	When he said that, did he know that the Treasury had not decided whether VAT should be paid? May we have a statement from the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, or from the right hon. Gentleman, as Chairman of the relevant Cabinet Sub-Committee, on the real cost of the Olympics and how they got the budget so wrong?
	Yesterday, when challenged about plans to split the Home Office, the Prime Minister said:
	"we will make an announcement to the House in the normal way."—[ Official Report, 24 January 2007; Vol. 455, c. 1413.]
	Will the Leader of the House confirm that, when a decision is taken, there will be a statement to the House on the subject, and will he say whether that statement will be made before or after the announcement to the "Today" programme?
	May we have a debate on personnel management in Government Departments, following today's revelation, based on an internal Government report, that staff at the Treasury are suffering from low morale, and that one in 10 is worried about bullying? The report shows that more people have departed from the ministerial services team, which works closely with the Chancellor, than any other section. Does that not show that there are serious problems at the Treasury under the current Chancellor of the Exchequer?
	Finally, last week, the Leader of the House referred to the dossier that I issued before Christmas, showing that there were 1,000 unanswered parliamentary questions in the last Session. He claimed then, and last week, that my figures were wrong. Sadly, he has been guilty of a certain amount of spin. Rather than going into all the details now, I will write to him, but to give just a taster, he said that an unanswered question about the number of pupils in each local authority in England who left school without any GCSE qualifications, excluding equivalents, since 1997 had indeed been answered. Well, it had not; the answer did not give the number of pupils, did not give a local authority breakdown, and used a different definition of qualifications.
	The right hon. Gentleman also made no apology for the "proper" use of the Prorogation system. Is it really proper use of that system for an hon. Member who tables a question in February to be told, nine months later in November, that there has not been time to answer the question? I hardly think so. Is it really an excuse to say that some answers had not been published in  Hansard? Written parliamentary answers should be available to all hon. Members and the public, and not just the Member who asked the question. If answers are not being published in  Hansard, the House should know, and the right hon. Gentleman should do something about it.

Jack Straw: The hon. Gentleman makes the first of what will, no doubt, be many sedentary interventions in business questions. In my 18 years in opposition, I spent too much of my life on the Opposition Front Bench, having to deal with the Committee stage of Bills, and I can say that there were plenty of occasions on which Bills went straight into Committee after Second Reading, and straight out of Committee into Report. That happened all the time, so I think that this Government have probably been more reasonable.
	On cost overruns in respect of the Olympics, the financial systems are indeed robust. Detailed discussions are taking place about some of the uncertainties in the financing of the Olympics—uncertainties that are inherent in any project of a similar scale and with a similar time scale, including the best-run of them. I am in close touch with my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury on the subject. I can tell the right hon. Member for Maidenhead that we will indeed make a statement to the House when matters are more settled.
	On the proposals, which have yet to be agreed, to split the Home Office, there should be a statement in the House, and I very much hope that it is the House that hears it first, rather than the editors of the "Today" programme. Such is the nature of modern politics, however, that I cannot promise that, but I entirely accept the point made by the right hon. Lady.
	The right hon. Lady also referred to an apparently leaked report about morale in the Treasury. All that I can say is that the Treasury has unquestionably been one of the most successful Government Departments in the past 10 years, as shown by the Government's highly successful ability to deliver on the economy. My right hon. Friend has just reminded the House, particularly Conservative Members, that we are about to enter the 40th successive quarter of economic growth under the Government—a record unrivalled by any British Government and almost any western Government since 1997. [Hon. Members: "Governments—plural."] No, it is 40 successive quarters under this Administration since 1997. It is 58 quarters if we include the previous Administration but I am very happy indeed to look at the first 10 years of the Conservative Administration. Of those 40 quarters, I recollect that there were a good 10 quarters in which there was no growth, and a good 10 quarters in the early 1980s and again in the late 1980s in which, far from any growth at all, there was a depression.
	The right hon. Lady mentioned the dossier published in early November in which she said that there were 1,000 unanswered questions. It will be embarrassing for her—and some of us remember with acute embarrassment her research into the titles of pop songs, which she tried to name in July—but the research turned out to be wrong. I deprecate the practice of leaving any question unanswered, and I particularly deprecate the failure to answer a question tabled in February until November. That is quite unacceptable, and I have always made that clear. My colleagues are told in terms if there are such problems. I do not want any unanswered questions, but may I tell the right hon. Lady—and she and I have discussed the matter with the Chairman of the Procedure Committee—that Ministers and officials have to work hard to answer all questions on time? It is an issue for the whole House, and it would affect any Government with whom she served, as the number of written questions has expanded, and expanded again. It has almost doubled in the past four years, so it is a serious issue, and the House as a whole needs to tackle it.

David Heath: I am sure the Leader of the House is familiar with the practice in restaurants of putting little symbols on the menu to show which dishes are suitable for vegetarians, for coeliacs and so on. Will he consider a similar system for the Order Paper, so that debates are clearly marked as being suitable for the Prime Minister? Before yesterday's debate, we were told at different points by the Prime Minister's spokesmen that he does not do Back-Bench debates—apparently, a debate in Government time opened by the Foreign Secretary is a Back-Bench debate—that he does not do foreign affairs debates, and then that he never attends such debates, whatever the topic may be. May we be assured that there are at least some debates that the Prime Minister would feel it appropriate to attend, rather than chumming up to the CBI? Perhaps one of them might be a debate on four years of war in which brave British soldiers are being killed on every day of every week.
	May we have a debate on the air passenger duty, which was raised by the hon. Member for North-West Cambridgeshire (Mr. Vara) in Chancellor's questions? Not only are there questions about the implementation, but practical difficulties. The Leader of the House knows that we support a tax on aviation, although we support a tax on the pollution caused by planes, rather than on the passengers who travel in them. Is it not the case that because the duty is retrospective, it will cause chaos in our airports and great difficulties for both travellers and airlines, as well as huge financial disadvantage to tour operators? A tour operator in my constituency, Gerry Copsey, points out in a letter to me that the tour operator has to absorb the first 2 per cent. of any surcharge, which he has not collected because the tax did not exist. That is therefore a direct and substantial windfall tax on tour operators. It cannot be right, and the House should have the opportunity to debate it.
	Last week the President of the United States gave the "State of the Union" address. May we have a debate on the state of the Union—in this case, the Act of Union between Scotland and England? There we could explore the huge advantages to both Scotland and England of the Union, we could address those who wish to split us asunder on any basis, some explicitly and some implicitly, and we could look at the ways in which we could improve the Union to ensure that every part of the Union feels that it has a fair voice.
	Lastly, on written questions—a matter which I often ask the Leader of the House to look into—my hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Foster) last week asked the Department for Culture, Media and Sport how many libraries closed in London. The reply from the Department was that it could not provide the information because
	"focusing on the number of closures is less helpful as a measure of overall provision than the net number of public library service points in each year"—[ Official Report, 23 January 2007; Vol. 455, c. 1620W.]—
	in other words, Departments now want to provide not only the answers, but the questions. Will the right hon. Gentleman remind his colleagues that we ask the questions and they are supposed to answer?

Jack Straw: I thank the hon. Gentleman, who is a former Chairman of the Procedure Committee and senior member of the Modernisation Committee, for his remarks about parliamentary questions. I hope that we can reach agreement, through the Procedure Committee's recommendations, on the matter on an all-party basis. I have no interest in restricting hon. Members' opportunities to question Ministers effectively. However, quantity is currently getting in the way of quality. If we got back to where we were even four years ago, there would be even less excuse for Departments' failure to answer questions on time. Questions are all answered in the end, but sometimes the delay is too great.
	I agree with the hon. Gentleman about the importance of Zimbabwe and the way in which it has slipped from the headlines and, in some cases, from the inside pages. I shall follow up his suggestion with my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.

Jack Straw: The answer to my hon. Friend's first question— [Interruption.] Well, I am not going get involved in a private argument about what did or did not happen on that Foreign Affairs Committee trip as I was not there and I am not a member of that Committee. On packaging, I have seen  The Independent's campaign to reduce it and I commend my hon. Friend's chairmanship of the all-party packaging manufacturing industry group. I will look for an opportunity to have this matter debated.

Mr. Speaker: Order. We take one day at a time in the House and what happened last night has nothing to do with next week's business.

Jack Straw: I understand my hon. Friend's concern and there will be a number of opportunities—on Adjournment in this place or in Westminster Hall—to debate the issue. I hope that my hon. Friend is successful in doing so.

Philip Davies: Will the Leader of the House ask the Secretary of State for Health to make a statement about the use of 0844, 0845 and 0870 numbers? One of my constituents has to ring an 0844 number to contact the local GP and I found out that 12 GP surgeries across the Bradford district are making people phone those numbers to book an appointment. I am sure that the Leader of the House knows that it is more expensive to ring those numbers than ordinary local numbers. Will the Secretary of State for Health thus make a statement about the use of those numbers across the national health service?

Martin Linton: May we have a debate about the way in which some councils are using the threat of council tax capping as an excuse for cutting services? Wandsworth council, for example, is using an entirely bogus threat of capping as a reason for cutting funding to very popular and widely respected local facilities such as the Wandsworth museum and Battersea art centre.

Jack Straw: I find it odd that of all the issues that a Liberal Democrat could raise, the hon. Lady asks about providing votes for rapists and murderers while they are serving their sentences— [Interruption.] That is the issue. The wider issue of what we do about a European Court judgment, which does not require us to give votes to rapists and murderers while they are serving their sentences, is the subject of consideration within the Government. I would have thought that the Liberal Democrats would do better to worry about the victims rather than the perpetrators of crime.

Chris Bryant: I did not say that there are.

Roger Williams: The Magistrates Association has expressed concern about the continuing closure of magistrates courts. In my constituency, some cases cannot proceed because witnesses, victims or defendants cannot attend because of transport problems and yet another court is threatened with closure. Will the Leader of the House make time for a debate on the working of the magistrates court system, which is the core of this country's criminal justice system?

Justine Greening: May we have a debate on crime on young people? Last year, 30 per cent. of all muggings recorded in England and Wales were perpetrated on 11 to 16-year-olds, but that is the tip of the iceberg when only 21 per cent. of muggings make it into the recorded police figures, and the British crime survey does not even interview people under 16. May we have a debate in the House to bring this issue to people's attention and to discuss what needs to be done to combat the problem?

Jack Straw: I would be happy to have a debate on the crime figures. Sadly, it has long been the case that young people have been the principal victims of street robbery, as well as the principal perpetrators. In that debate, I would be delighted to hear about the excellent crime figures that were announced today, which I notice that no member of the Opposition has mentioned because they are good news. They are not the British crime survey figures but the recorded crime figures, and they show that the most feared crime, violence that causes injury, is down 7 per cent. compared with last year, that sexual offences are down 4 per cent. and that crimes involving firearms are down 14 per cent. All recorded crime is down 3 per cent., and— [ Interruption.] I am sorry to have to tell the shadow Leader of the House this, but according to the British crime survey, crime is down 35 per cent. since 1997.

John Grogan: May we have a statement next week from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on whether he intends to ask Ofcom to undertake a public interest test into BSkyB's acquisition of 20 per cent. of the shares in ITV? Is there not an overwhelming case for such a test, given that the Office of Fair Trading has found provisionally that there could be a relevant merger issue?

Jack Straw: I know that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has this matter under active consideration. My hon. Friend will appreciate, however, that my right hon. Friend has to act in a quasi judicial manner, and strictly in accordance with the relevant legal criteria. I will of course pass on my hon. Friend's remarks to my right hon. Friend.

Graham Stuart: Beverley high school and Beverley grammar school, which are two well-run, successful, over-subscribed comprehensive schools serving mixed areas of Beverley, are facing redundancies of key teaching staff and a worsening financial situation over the next three years. May we have an urgent debate on the allocation of education funding between authorities across the country, on the growing sense of grievance among communities that are seeing cutbacks in everything from transport to NHS beds and on impression that money is not being allocated fairly across the country?

Greg Mulholland: The right hon. Gentleman will be aware of the growing concern at the increasing number of schools that are collecting data on pupils that is derived from biometrics such as fingerprinting, for use in electronic registration and library systems. He will also be aware of the fact that legal opinion, including that of the British Educational Communications and Technology Agency, has stated that this practice contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998. Does he agree that it is time to debate this important subject in the House?

Jack Straw: I do not mind having a debate on the issue. We had a pretty intensive debate during the passage of the Human Rights Act, and I agreed to amendments to try to accommodate the position of religious organisations, particularly the Christian Churches. Without referring to the current controversy, I know that the hon. Gentleman is a secularist, and I respect his views, but his is not the position of the vast majority of this country, 70 per cent. of whom declared themselves to be Christian in the 2001 census, and there are many who subscribe to other religions. He is against faith schools; I am not. We have a long tradition of faith schools in this country. His position, which is partly the Liberal Democrat position, is not ours. I am happy, however, to debate all of that.

Julian Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am sure that you are aware of the recent court case that has led to yet another reversal in the attempt to limit the protest in Parliament square. Whatever one thinks about that, there can surely be no human right to fill the square with incessant amplified noise, which interferes with the ability of Members to do their work, and which is a distraction and danger to police who are in the front line of providing security to the House. Have you received any advice as to whether the latest court judgment entitles the protestor in the square to recommence, as he has done, the broadcasting of amplified messages at unbearably high volume in that public place, which would not be allowed anywhere else that I can think of?

Douglas Hogg: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. It is not exclusively a matter for the police because one could secure a civil injunction, and the authorities of the House might be able to do so against the protestor.

Nadine Dorries: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I know that you are aware of my interest in abortion and my abhorrence of late abortions. Last week, at business questions, I brought to the attention of the Leader of the House the fact that organisations, individuals and PCTs were raising concerns with me that, as a result of NHS deficits and restrictions on finances, women were waiting up to seven or eight weeks longer than normal for terminations, some of which were even being tipped over into the next financial year.
	To gain some supporting statistical evidence for those claims, I wrote to the appropriate Ministers. The Ministers of State at the Department of Health, the hon. Members for Don Valley (Caroline Flint) and for Leigh (Andy Burnham) respectively advised me that the answers to my questions would be in the Library. The Library has told me that it does not have answers to those questions. In my attempt to gain the evidence, I feel that I am being given the run-around. Will you give me your advice on that?

Secretary John Reid, supported by the Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary Prescott, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Secretary Darling, Ms Harriet Harman and Mr. Liam Byrne, presented a Bill to make provision about immigration and asylum; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 26 January, and to be printed. Explanatory notes to be printed. [Bill 53].

New clause 1
	 — 
	Applications under section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003: notice of transfer

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation in response to my intervention, but I cannot let the matter pass without commenting briefly on the extraordinary situation that we now face in regard to Home Office criminal justice legislation.
	I had the pleasure of serving on the Committee considering the Bill that became the 2003 Act—a flagship Bill that was supposed to define the Government's approach to criminal justice for a long time to come. It was suggested to us that the Bill was well researched, that all the necessary consultations had taken place, that the judiciary had been consulted on how aspects of it would be implemented, and that the Government knew what they were doing.
	I have to say very gently to the Minister that, to my mind, the fact that three years after the passage of that Bill the Government have apparently not succeeded in getting their consultation together highlights the absurd situation in which the House finds itself over and over again with criminal justice Bills. I believe we have had nearly 60 pieces of Home Office legislation since 1997. The judiciary complain that the law has become so opaque and incomprehensible and there are so many rules and regulations that they have difficulty in keeping pace with what is happening. We have seen many examples of repeal of Government legislation before the relevant schedule has even been implemented, and this appears to me to be exactly such an example.

Keith Vaz: Has the hon. Gentleman had a chance to look at the evidence of Lord Justice Potter, the president of the Family Division and Master of the Rolls, to the Constitutional Affairs Committee? It is not just a question of legislation; it is a question of proposals such as the Carter proposals. The judges themselves are begging the Government "Please, no more, because we need to see the implications of what the Government are doing."

Simon Hughes: I support that entirely. I also support the provision for a sunset mechanism enabling such proposals to lapse if the Government do not deliver.
	There is a second thing that we still do not do, and ought to do. The other day I spoke at an event celebrating the 50th anniversary of the organisation Justice, along with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General said that he and the Government support the objective of codifying the criminal law. We also do so—as, I think, does the Conservative party. The best way to start to achieve that objective is to make sure that as proposed legislation comes before us in Home Office business—it will mainly come before us in Home Office business, but it will also occasionally come across Law Officers' desks—we update wider legislation so that we end up with a consolidated Act, as it were, on the subject in question. Therefore, in the context of this Bill on jury trial, we should end up not with a Bill that is slim and appealing—as this one is—but with an updated version of either the Fraud Act 2006 or the Criminal Justice Act 2003. We would then have only one piece of legislation, and therefore when we start to put proposed legislation in 2007 together with legislation enacted in 1998 or 2003 or whenever, what has not been addressed that should have been addressed will become obvious to us, and many more issues will be dealt with.
	I also want to offer an encouragement—it is not a proposal because it refers to something that has been achieved. A new parliamentary process has belatedly been adopted which did not apply to this Bill: before the merits of the wording of legislation are deliberated in Committee, there is the ability to take evidence on it. Although the Bill missed the deadline, we have now agreed to that process, so I am not criticising the Government. I hope that that process will be valuable, because I hope that the people who give evidence to us about the practical implications of Bills will be the sort who are likely to say to us, for example, "You do realise, don't you, that the measures to which this part of the Bill refers have not yet been implemented?" Therefore we as legislators, as well as the Government and civil servants, will be alerted to problems such as that which the new clause addresses.
	I do not object to agreeing to the new clause. It is more than a technical amendment, but it is not the most substantive part of the Bill by any means—we will come to that shortly. However, it raises questions to do with the process of government and, to be blunt, as my party's Front Benchers have often said—as have Conservative Front Benchers—if we had legislated less and administered better in the past 10 years, criminal justice and the Home Office would not have such an unsettled or declining reputation. That is not in anybody's interests; it is not in the country's interests that criminal justice and the Home Office do not have a good reputation.

Simon Hughes: As you indicated, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I will also speak to new clause 5, which, with your agreement, I shall seek leave to put to a vote at the end of the debate, rather than new clause 4.
	The new clauses would amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which was the last substantive piece of legislation that this House passed in relation to the issues under discussion. In the principal legislation, the House debated whether there might be exceptions to the rule that serious criminal cases should have a jury trial. Parliament agreed—this has been enacted—that in certain cases that can now happen. The most obvious case that has been agreed is where there has been tampering with the jury. There is a procedure that allows an application for a non-jury trial in that exceptional circumstance. It was acknowledged that that should be allowed.
	There was another Government proposition—which had been raised and debated before—that there should be a trail without a jury in serious fraud cases. As Members will recall, that was extremely controversial. Because it was both controversial and was raised at the end of the parliamentary Session, it put at risk the Government's ability to secure the agreement of both Houses of Parliament to that Criminal Justice Bill. The outcome of the ensuing negotiations between the then Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett), and Baroness Scotland and Opposition spokespeople in both Houses was that that part of the Bill would be implemented only if an affirmative order were subsequently passed by both Houses. Effectively, it was put on hold except in cases when Parliament agrees to its implementation. Since then, the Government have sought on one occasion to implement it by using that process. They managed to get the order passed in this House, but it was made clear to them that it was unlikely that the order would be passed in the House of Lords, so they did not proceed down that route. The Bill provides a mechanism to return to that issue, but by way of a new and substantive piece of primary legislation.
	One of the elements of that Criminal Justice Act 2003 regime—were it implemented—was to impose necessary preconditions before a trial without a jury could take place in serious fraud cases. Section 43(5) of that Act states:
	"The condition is that the complexity of the trial or the length of the trial (or both) is likely to make the trial so burdensome to the members of a jury hearing the trial that the interests of justice require that serious consideration should be given to the question of whether the trial should be conducted without a jury."
	The key passage is from "so burdensome" onward. New clause 4, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) and I on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, and new clause 5, tabled on a cross-party basis by Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, are two changes that would toughen up those conditions.
	As the Solicitor-General and the Minister well know, my party and I—and, as I understand it, the Conservative party—remain clearly of the view that we will not support the Bill. That is our clear and unchanged position, which we adopted in 1998 and maintained in 2003, 2005 and throughout 2006. We continue to defend jury trial in 2007, because it is the best form of trial for serious criminal cases.

Simon Hughes: I am very happy to have that debate on appropriate occasions, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and there will doubtless be many. The important point is that although this measure relates to courts in England and Wales, people from all over the world—not just all over the UK—appear before those courts, and we want jury trial for those who appear before them on serious charges, including serious fraud charges. So our position is absolutely clear. This is about the safeguards that we put in place and what conditions will be satisfied if, against our will and our votes in both Houses, such a proposal were to pass through Parliament.
	New clause 4 would insert the following alternative wording:
	"The condition is the complexity of the trial or the length of the trial (or both) would be likely to make the trial so burdensome to the members of a jury hearing the trial that the interests of justice required that the trial should be conducted without a jury."
	The current law says that
	"serious consideration should be given to the question of whether the trial should be conducted without a jury".
	We say that the test needs to be firmer than that and as new clause 4 states, the law should state that the
	"interests of justice required that the trial should be conducted without a jury."
	The burden of making the case must fall on the Government. They are seeking to persuade us that there will be circumstances in which the interests of justice require that a trial be conducted without a jury, but so far we have not heard a strong argument from them in that regard.
	If I may, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I will reserve until we move on to the next group of amendments, because it will be more appropriate then, discussion of the strong evidence that makes it clear that all that we know about jurors serving on serious fraud trials supports the argument that they do understand the complexities of such cases and want to continue to do that job. There is no evidence to suggest that jurors find such trials a problem. If that is indeed so—if there is not an interests of justice case that one can argue from the point of view of the juror—only one of two counter-arguments can be advanced.
	The Minister and the Solicitor-General have advanced one of them in previous debates, but they have not advanced the second, which I will explain in due course. The first argument, to repeat phrases used by the Solicitor-General and others, is that the full culpability of the case—in other words, the full range of the offence—would be better available to the courts in trials without a jury. The Solicitor-General will make his own speech in his own way, but the argument throughout the debate has been that one flaw of the present system is that one has to cut down a case, as it were, to put it to the jury, because it would otherwise become too long and complex—in other words, too risky in terms of the jury's comprehension. As a result, not all the defendants who might be charged in a given case are charged, or not all the charges that might be put on the indictment are put.
	Interestingly, the only jury who have recently spoken on this issue did not say that the prosecution had confused them, although they did point out that the defence was sometimes not as clear as it might have been. Our view is that, in the interests of justice, we should always make sure that everybody who should be charged is charged, but the interests of justice are not necessarily served by having 24 or 48 counts on an indictment if six will do. The House will be aware that because the maximum sentence for one count is the same as for another, similar count, a court's ability to punish someone with imprisonment—actual and immediate, or suspended—or a fine, for example, is not changed simply by the addition of counts. Of course, if there were 10 counts, for example, a judge could say that they must be served consecutively, but 12 or 24 counts are not needed to achieve the justice that a smaller number of counts can achieve.

Douglas Hogg: May I reinforce the point that the hon. Gentleman is making? If one puts 21counts on the indictment, one then has to adduce evidence as to those 21 counts. That is likely to be extremely confusing for a jury, who will face an inordinate and quite unnecessary amount of evidence.

Simon Hughes: Well, shall we say that it is a less principled position? I would understand it if the hon. and learned Member for Medway does not agree with our less principled and more compromised position.

David Heath: My hon. Friend knows that I agree with him on this issue, but is not there another important distinction to be made in the context of this new clause? By introducing the phrase "in the interests of justice", we move away from the position that the Solicitor-General approached in Committee—without quite reaching, although he came perilously close—of saying that one of his prime objectives was conviction, not justice. If it comes to a choice between the interests of justice or of conviction, I know where my sympathies lie and, I suspect, those of the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews).

Simon Hughes: I hope that my hon. Friend has drawn the hon. and learned |Member for Medway back towards us with that intervention. It was a serious concern to my hon. Friend and I in Committee that the Solicitor-General, whom we like and respect, veered towards saying that his proposal would increase conviction rates. We could certainly quote phrases back at him. However, a conviction—a finding of guilt—does not necessarily mean a just result. There are still too many people unjustly convicted by our system.
	I looked back through the annual reports of the Serious Fraud Office, which has existed since 1998 principally to deal with such cases, and one of the arguments that it has never used—I stand to be corrected—is that non-jury trials should be introduced because they would increase conviction rates. The SFO makes many arguments in its annual reports on how to improve the process, how more cases could be brought to court and how conviction rates could be improved, but they are not to do with the difference between jury trials and non-jury trials.
	One instance in which the interests of justice might be better served by a non-jury trial than a jury trial might be if such publicity had been given to a case or the defendants—we have had some examples recently, although not in serious fraud cases. Before any charges have been laid, people have appeared in the press and on the radio and television as the likely defendants. One could argue that the interests of justice would dictate that the members of a jury would not be able to disregard what they had heard, read or seen to enable them to reach a correct judgment. My experience of the courts is that in every case where that is an issue—perhaps there has been widespread national or regional publicity—the judge has gone out of his or her way to make it clear that the members of the jury have to put what they have heard or read about the case out their minds. My understanding is that they appreciate the need to do that. So I dismiss the argument that non-jury trials are necessary in such cases.

Douglas Hogg: I rise to support what the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) has said, and to speak more specifically to new clause 5. Like the hon. Gentleman, and like my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) on the Opposition Front Bench, I am very much against this Bill. On the other hand, it will be carried through this House, and possibly through the House of Lords, although that may be unlikely. Our business, therefore, is to try and improve the Bill, even though we do not want it to make progress. It is in that spirit that I shall make my remarks.
	The Criminal Justice Act 2003 stipulates that the consideration that applies when determining whether a trial should be heard without a jury is whether its complexity and length would be burdensome to a jury, but the length and complexity of fraud cases are not peculiar to them. Cases involving terrorism and conspiracies, for example, or ones with many people accused of drugs offences are also long and complex. We are setting a dangerous precedent if we accept that it is only length or complexity that justifies a non-jury trial, because that is to create an argument—irresistible in logic—that the same conditions should be applied to non-fraud cases.
	I can foresee Ministers saying, "Parliament has decided that this is appropriate in fraud cases, so why should we not apply that precedent to other cases?" The Government have a track record of doing that, and they have tried many times to dilute the classes of case in respect of which a jury is required to be empanelled. I refuse to grant Ministers that precedent, because I object fundamentally to these proposals.
	I propose however to adopt an approach that earlier I characterised rather kindly as the less principled one. Given that the Bill is going to progress through this House, surely we are obliged to try and improve it? Is it possible that there might be occasions when the interests of justice might require a non-jury trial? I find that difficult to contemplate, for the sort of reasons that the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) always advances so eloquently, but I do not exclude the possibility.
	Certainly, I can contemplate a test that is much more satisfactory than the one proposed by the Solicitor-General. Two options are presented in the new clauses—the Liberal Democrat version in new clause 4, or the version in new clause 5 that is supported by hon. Members from both main Opposition parties.
	The test that we propose would determine whether the interests of justice might require a non-jury trial. As I said, I can conceive of circumstances when that might be so. For example, I noted earlier—and the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey acknowledged my point—that the coroner in the Princess Diana inquest held that it was right to for that inquest not to have a jury. I am not in any sense questioning the merits of that decision, but I believe that she came to that conclusion because the fact that a lot of evidence would come from abroad, either through interpreters or in translation, could cause difficulties for a jury.
	I can see that juries might find it difficult fully to handle evidence in deeply complicated cases that comes from abroad. To put it differently, it is possible that a defendant might apply for non-jury trial for those reasons, and I emphasise that I support a defendant's right to make such an application.
	If defendants are allowed to apply for non-jury trial, they may decide to do so for reasons of cost. That means that another class of case will become increasingly common. With more defendants funding their own defence, they might well think that their trial would be abbreviated if no jury were involved—clearly an attractive proposition. Moreover, even when a defendant is not providing the funding, long trials can be enormously costly, and that would be another reason to opt for the possible brevity of a non-jury trial.
	For those reasons, I do not want to exclude the possibility that there are a few classes of case in which a non-jury trial could be authorised, especially when the defendant make that application. However, I do not think that that should happen on grounds of complexity or length—simpliciter.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: I do not want to be tiresome, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman is making a persuasive point about the need to mitigate what is a thoroughly bad Bill. He said that he does not want Ministers to say that Parliament's acceptance of the argument about length and complexity allows them to apply such conditions more widely, but how would mitigation help to prevent that? The Government have form in such matters, and will use any argument that comes to hand. Would not matters be made worse if they were able to say that the House of Commons has decided that jury trial may be abrogated for reasons of the interests of justice, and not just length and complexity?

Douglas Hogg: No, I do not think that it would be. The Government's proposals rest exclusively on a trial's length and complexity, difficulties that arise in many non-fraud cases. Making a concession on those grounds would be to drive a coach and horses though the principle that trials should be held before a jury. The problem that we are wrestling with is that the Bill will make progress: it will leave this House, and go before the House of Lords. Are we therefore in the business of trying to improve a bad Bill, or should we simply assert that it is bad and not try to improve it?
	The choice is not an ideal one. The hon. and learned Member for Medway disagrees, but I have concluded that I am in the business of improving a bad Bill. However, I accept that it is perfectly respectable to argue that this is such a bad Bill that we should spit on it, throw it out and have no more to do with it. If we believe that, we might as well not debate the new clauses before us: we should just accept that the Bill is bad, go straight to Third Reading and find ourselves beaten in the vote at the end of that. That is not what I want to do.
	I could go on at length, but I shall not do so. The condition in section 43(5) of the 2003 Act is a jolly bad one. We can improve it to make it slightly less objectionable, and I commend that approach to the House.

Dominic Grieve: I am delighted to hear the comments of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg). Like him, I face a dilemma. The Bill is a bad piece of legislation. I explained that on Second Reading and in Committee. On occasion I have made some attempts to see if there is any way forward to a compromise in respect of how the trial process takes place and whether it can be independent of the judge's decision. I have not been successful. In this Bill it is particularly difficult. Any attempt, for example, to argue that we should have a special jury has been ruled out of order because on Second Reading we decided to dispense with juries. There is an all or nothing quality about the Bill.
	I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that it is important, notwithstanding the distaste with which we view the legislation, to consider the situation if and when the Bill reaches the statute book and seek to mitigate as far as possible its worst effects. In Committee we discussed whether there should be an interest of justice test. Notwithstanding what I heard from the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews), I think that that takes the matter a little further in providing some guidance to the judiciary on how they should approach the matter—not just the question of burdensomeness or length, but also interest of justice—widening a little and, I hope, as a result restricting a little more the circumstances in which the court would grant trial by judge alone. I accept that there are difficulties and for that reason I am supportive of new clause 5. My name does not appear at the top of the list of promoters, although I rather thought that I drafted it. It may turn out that somebody else had the same idea.

Dominic Grieve: All I can say is that when I went to the Table Office to table my amendment I do not remember seeing any amendment in the name of the Liberal Democrats along the lines of new clause 5. In a conciliatory spirit I shall return to the main issue, which is the contents of the new clause.
	The key issue will turn on the likely impact of the safety of the verdict. That has a particular merit. To understand it, one must return to the Government's stated position. The Government have gone out of their way—they have no option but to—to insist that juries are capable of returning true verdicts. If they were to depart from that principle, they would announce their complete lack of confidence in the entirety of the jury trial system. Indeed, we know from the Wooler inquiry into the collapse of the Jubilee line case—one of the very few pieces of evidence that we have about the ways juries function—and from the supporting research documents that went with it, which I conveniently obtained the day before Second Reading, that in that trial, which meandered on for 18 months before it collapsed, the jury had a very good grasp of the issues in the case. There is every reason to suppose, when one considers the responses that the jury gave to those who investigated the matter, that had they had an opportunity of returning the verdict, no one could suggest from the evidence that the verdict would have been unsafe or unsatisfactory, because after 18 months they had preserved a complete grip on the issues that they were having to consider.
	If we were to adopt new clause 5, it would have the merit that it would be rather difficult ever to have a trial without a jury because it would have to be argued before a judge that there was something about the complexity or length of the trial which made it likely that the safety of the verdict might be impaired. In such circumstances no trial without a jury, on the existing evidence that we have, would ever take place. That is why I commend the new clause.

Dominic Grieve: I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman that that is an important consideration.
	We must be realistic about this. In our daily lives most of us have had the opportunity to meet people, not necessarily in a professional context, but neighbours or friends, who have served on juries. Some people find doing two weeks' jury service, which probably includes four or five days sitting and the rest of the time being sent home, to be burdensome. I would not wish to say that they were being lily-livered. It may well be that the impact on their own lives has been considerable. Equally, I have done long trials lasting many months when it seemed to me that the jurors were deriving considerable enjoyment from the work that they were being called on to do. Friendships are made. Indeed, in some cases marriages have followed. Many, particularly those who may be retired or are not in full employment, have found it an extremely fulfilling and important experience in their life. That is a reason why we have jury trials. Simply to imply that length leads to burdensomeness seems to be mistaken.
	I have retained the issue of complexity. We know that many extremely complex trials that take place will not fall into the category of being capable of being assigned to a judge alone. For example, the Crevice trial which is taking place has lasted many months. We do not know when the verdict will be returned. It is an ordinary criminal case being tried by a jury. It is a matter of great importance involving scientific evidence, and the jury is thought to be capable. My practice included health and safety work. The cases which are contested are often extremely technical in their nature. Jurors arrive in the jury box and are presented with three or four Lever arch files to share between two of them, including documents, background material and the business documents of the company concerned and other contractors. During the course of the trial they have to consider expert evidence and sometimes look at models which have been made and brought into the court. All such trials are as complex or as likely to be as complex as any fraud trial that I can imagine, and sometimes they last many weeks and months. Yet in those circumstances the Government at the moment—I am mindful of what the hon. and learned Member for Medway says about the risks of the wedge in the door—have not considered suggesting to the House that those trials should be removed from jurors.

David Winnick: Although I will be giving the Government the benefit of the doubt, which I know is disappointing to the hon. Gentleman, I take seriously his point about the wedge in the door. As I have mentioned to my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General I am concerned at the possibility that if this goes through, the Government might be encouraged to go further. I have had an assurance from my hon. and learned Friend that that will not be the position, but I am concerned. Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the question of the wedge is not lost on a number of Labour Members?

Dominic Grieve: As the hon. Gentleman knows, the Government whom he supports are greatly driven by opinion polls. Indeed, I have come to the conclusion that they frequently take opinion poll soundings. We know a little bit about such soundings, although things may have changed. I once saw an interesting internal document that the Government produced a couple years ago—I am not sure that I should have seen it, but it seemed to land on my desk. It explained some of the Government's background motivation on the issue of fraud trials. It recognised that support for the principle of jury trial was extremely high. Equally, the Government's soundings showed that the public were disquieted by occasional examples of fraud trials that cost huge sums, ran for many months and then collapsed. On the back of those findings, the Government seemed to adopt the approach that they should apply their mind to the issue of long and complex fraud trials, because the findings were a justification that juries should be dispensed with in such cases.
	That point is germane to the amendment because as I was trying to explain, I find it difficult to follow the intellectual argument, since there are plenty of other examples of long and complex trials. Another important point is that the evidence suggests that long and complex fraud trials that collapse do so for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with juries. That is the evidence that came out of Mr. Wooler's report into the Jubilee line case, although at first sight, when his findings were splashed all over the papers, a bad impression was created of a trial with a jury that had lasted 18 months and had collapsed. The trial had cost millions of pounds—I cannot even remember the sums involved, but they were colossal—so it appeared to have a somewhat scandalous quality. However, when one reads Mr. Wooler's report, it turns out that the problems lay with the Crown Prosecution Service's approach to the matter. There may also have been other factors on which Mr. Wooler was not in a position to comment, but one thing is certain: the collapse had nothing to do with the jury. The supporting documentation went quite the other way and showed clearly that the jury was working well in that case.

Mike O'Brien: Let me deal with this issue. I will then give way.
	What I have just said is not the reason that section 43 is needed. It is not part of our case to suggest that juries or judges in such cases bring in verdicts that are unsafe. The presence or absence of the jury will not have an effect on the fairness of the trial itself.
	In his closing remarks, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) seemed to reveal what the new clause is really about. He said that if it is passed, it is very unlikely that there will ever be a non-jury trial. In other words, it is a wrecking amendment. It seeks to wreck the intention behind the Bill. I therefore inform Opposition Members that the Government will oppose it.

Mike O'Brien: The hon. Gentleman is right that that is the intention, but I was trying to deal with both sides of the argument: what if there is a jury and what if a judge makes the decision. In our view, the safety of the verdicts will be there in any event. We are looking at what the best conditions will be for the judge to decide whether it should be a jury or non-jury trial. We therefore need to look at both sides of the argument and our view is that it will be a safe verdict either way.

Dominic Grieve: If it is a safe verdict either way, why are we passing this Bill? That is the question that needs to be addressed. The new clause is not a wrecking amendment. I reassure the Solicitor-General that is designed to go to the very heart of the Government's concerns. By doing so and if the Government realise that their concerns are misplaced, at this late hour I urge him to tell his colleagues to drop the Bill.

Mike O'Brien: Let me deal with the intervention and then I will give way.
	The report on Jubilee line case gives us evidence of the burden on juries. If the hon. Member for Beaconsfield looks at page 7 and the interviews with jurors in that case, he will see that the report says:
	"Some jurors had serious difficulties with their employers, including attempts to dismiss them, and would have liked more concrete help.
	There are several quotes from jurors. One said:
	"They told me to sign or I would have no job to go back to."
	Another said:
	"He sent me a P45"
	The report adds:
	"Unco-operative employers could also cause problems over claims for allowances."
	It quotes a juror as saying:
	"As a juror it is your responsibility to get the stuff off your work, so if your work is being funny about it, if they don't want to fill in the form...it's a bit of a joke."
	There is a whole series of such quotes.
	The report goes further on page 13. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield mentioned the report, so let me draw his attention to some of the points on the other side of the argument. The report deals with the jurors return to work and says:
	"Return to work for seven of the 11 interviewed presented continuing problems nearly five months on. These include one who has been made redundant, one in an employment dispute, one required to undertake extensive re-training who has missed a definite and much desired promotion, and one signed off by his doctor as suffering from stress as a result of the work situation."
	It goes on.
	My point is about the burden being imposed on juries as a result of very lengthy and complex fraud trials, and the House should take cognisance of that. Given those points, we need to ensure that we have legislation that allows the full culpability of a defendant in a complex and serious fraud trial to be exposed before the court without placing such undue burdens on jurors.
	As the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said, problems can arise in a range of other lengthy trials. That is certainly the case, but no other area of law or type of criminal case has the history of serious and complex fraud cases. That has been made clear by Roskill and Auld; I do not need to go into the history of this. The House has debated the issues on many occasions.
	I can say to my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) that we do not have plans to go further. There is no wedge. This is about a particular area of criminal law that has a long history.

Mike O'Brien: I had promised to give way but I then intend to make progress. I give way first to my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North and then I will give way to the right hon. and learned Gentleman.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: On the narrow issue of the Jubilee line case and the inquiry, it needs to be placed on the record that the overwhelming burden of the report was that the case was an aberration, because of the way in which it was presented and run, largely by the prosecution. Of course, that put a burden on the jury. However, it also needs to be on the record that in September of the year before the March in which the case was stopped, and also in February, defence counsel wrote to the Attorney-General and told him in terms that the case was an aberration and was heading for the rocks. I am sorry to say that, in September, the Attorney-General, having looked at that correspondence, did not intervene in the case. Had he done so many of the problems that people are now canvassing would have been avoided.

Simon Hughes: This debate has been more interesting than I anticipated it would be. We have heard about three different types of argument—my hon. Friends have counted them—on why we should move in the direction proposed by the Government.
	I shall concentrate on new clause 5. The fundamental flaw now revealed in the Government's argument—it has been quoted by Liberal Democrat Members—is that they are praying in aid an argument that could apply to any long trial. I should like to discuss the evidence in the Jubilee line case. To those who read our proceedings later, I commend the full, officially commissioned report, "Report on Interviews with Jurors in the Jubilee Line Case" by Professor Sally Lloyd-Bostock of Birmingham university. A section entitled "Effects on employment and careers", from which the Solicitor-General took examples and read excerpts, does indeed say that a long trial could impact adversely on the individuals concerned, but it goes on to address, in greater detail, the issue of fraud trials and the type of trials that we are discussing.
	The only substantive addition that I want to make to the debate is to put on record what the report said on that subject, because this debate is not about long trials, but about fraud trials, and uniquely and unusually, we have clear evidence on fraud trials. A section headed "Portrayal in the media" said:
	"Jurors felt unfairly portrayed as the cause of the collapse of the trial. They particularly objected to the portrayal of them in the press as unable to understand evidence or remember evidence and reach a fair verdict. Some were not particularly concerned, but others were very upset."
	Then there is a quote of someone:
	"I was just so angry—to blame us when it was not managed properly, it was a farce."
	There is a whole section dealing with jurors' responses to cases such as the Jubilee line case. Bearing in mind that that was one of the longest trials ever and that it was later aborted, it is interesting that under the heading, "The jurors' attitude to their jury service at the start of the trial and as it progressed", the report says:
	"All but one juror still definitely support the principle of jury service. There was considerable concern...expressed about the removal of the right to jury trial, including for long trials."
	That is the jurors, and not the politicians, speaking. The report quotes a juror:
	"on any trial, [trial by jury] is a fundamental right of any British person. If you start bringing in judges, or financial wizards or whatever you are not being judged by your peers."
	The professor's report goes on to say, in a section called "The jury's understanding of the case—overview", that
	"There are obvious limitations to assessing the extent to which the jury in fact understood the evidence and the issues in the case on the basis of the interviews. Because a juror says he or she understands, we cannot be sure he or she really did. Moreover, the jurors were interviewed almost five months after the...trial...Within those limitations, it did appear that when the case collapsed this jury, taken as a group, had a good understanding of the case, the issues and the evidence so far, as presented to them... The interviews show the importance of considering the jury as a whole."
	The report continues:
	"The jurors' assessments of their own and others' understanding produced a consistent, generally optimistic picture."
	In that same section, following paragraphs show that even though the jurors were interviewed five months later, without their notebooks and their notes, they were not thrown by the fact that the trial was a fraud trial. That is the fundamental point.
	The Solicitor-General is wrong when he says, "We've tried everything else", because we have not yet done so. In the past two years, there has been the Lord Chief Justice's protocol of 2005, the changes brought about as a result of the Jubilee line case, the inspector's report and the Law Officers' recommendations, the Fraud Act 2006, and the testing of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. In addition, there is a cross-governmental review that has not yet produced its final report and recommendations. All that has meant that there have been practical changes in the way in which prosecution and defence manage their cases.
	The point of new clause 5 is that if we lose the argument on the principle, we at least want some reserve positions or fall-backs. The best fall-back position would be to ensure that burdensomeness and length of trial were not sufficient of themselves; there must be an "interests of justice" case and a "safety of the verdict" case, too. That is why we would include the backstop positions set out in the new clauses.
	I ask the House to support new clause 5—if you allow us to vote on it, Mr. Deputy Speaker—not because it would be good to have a Bill that included the amendment, but because if, in the end, we have to accept a Bill that takes such a nonsensical and illogical route, it is better to make that slight improvement to the conditions that must be met if there is to be a non-jury trial. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
	 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Simon Hughes: Indeed. That is more true now that the rules on legal representation have changed. There has been criticism—justified, in some cases—that people who appear to be well off have been getting legal assistance from the public purse for a long case, and there may be more of those cases.
	To summarise, people might normally prefer a jury to a judge, because they think a jury might represent them better, for gender, ethnic or other reasons, but in a case that has attracted great publicity or, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman says, in one involving substantial cost, they might prefer to appear before a judge alone. New clause 9 argues for equality of opportunity to make the case.
	New clause 10 makes the supplementary point that, if a judge is to consider an application from the prosecution, there should be an opportunity for oral representations—a public presentation of the reasons for not wishing the case to go to a judge-only trial—or, if one defendant made such an application, the other defendants should have the right to present orally to the court the reasons for not wishing the case to go before a non-jury trial.
	New clauses 11 and 13 are similar. They are perhaps the most important in the group and would provide for a necessary further safeguard. If an order to go to a judge-only trial was found not only to be unnecessary in the interests of a safe verdict or in the interests of justice, but that it would
	"significantly disadvantage or otherwise prejudice a defendant or any of the defendants",
	there must be an opportunity for the law to say that it should not be permissible. The balance of argument must allow that, even if only one of a large group of defendants would be prejudiced, the alternative of a judge-only trial would not be open to the court.
	I want to comment on the number of cases that we are considering and the reason for my hope that hon. Members believe that every defendant's right should be taken into account. Let me give the numbers of cases in which the Serious Fraud Office reported that it had been involved in recent years: eight trials in 2001-02; 14 trials in 2002-03; 14 trials in 2003-04; 22 trials in 2004-05; and 10 trials in 2005-06. As we would expect, there are many more than one defendant per trial. Let me provide the number of defendants in that five-year span: 13 in 2001-02; 25 in 2002-03; 39 in 2003-04; 58 in 2004-05; and 23 in 2005-06. There are many defendants and it is important that the interests of each are considered. Serious fraud cases are, by definition, more likely than other types of cases to involve many defendants.
	If we wish to protect the interests of defendants, we must examine the other two or three columns that the Serious Fraud Office produces each year on the success rate of the current system. We do not argue that changing from one system to another would or should increase convictions or acquittals. The Government appear periodically to make the case that, if we changed the system, there would be more convictions. However, there has been a significant number of convictions and the Serious Fraud Office has never claimed that serious fraud cases result in an unusual number of acquittals.
	Before our current debates, the Government never made such a claim. We understand the reason for that when we consider the number of convictions for the past five years: 10 in 2001-02; 17 in 2002-03; 20 in 2003-04; 37 out of 58 cases in 2004-05; and 13 out of 23 in 2005-06. The difference is obviously the number of people acquitted. The conviction rate is 77 per cent.; 68 per cent.; 51 per cent.; 61 per cent. and 57 per cent. Those percentages apply to big cases, in which many people are involved. The conviction rate is regularly over 50 per cent. On one occasion, it exceeded 75 per cent., and, on two others, it was more than 50 per cent. though less than 60 per cent. The Liberal Democrat case is that the current system has worked relatively well but is working better because of changes. It would adversely affect the interests of the defendant and of justice if further changes, such as those for which the Government argue, were made. However, if further changes occur and fraud trials are tackled differently, defendants must be treated the same as the prosecution, and the interests of every defendant—not only that of the defence as a whole—must be considered.
	I hope that hon. Members will be sympathetic to those arguments and that we shall have the opportunity to test the House's opinion on at least some of them.

Dominic Grieve: The new clauses are important and we had an opportunity to explore some of the issues surrounding them in Committee. They raise a difficult matter, as touched on by the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes). New clause 9—or, for that matter, new clause 13, which was tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg)—has the consequence that more trials without juries are likely. The provisions give the defence an opportunity to make an application for trial without a jury.
	In Committee—and even now—I found myself slightly torn on the matter. I believe in jury trials and I do not believe in the Bill, but I also believe in fairness. It seems to me that if a system is to be introduced by which a prosecutor can go to a judge on an application and argue that the defendant should be deprived of the opportunity of a trial by jury—notwithstanding the fact that the defendant may wish to have one—it is very difficult intellectually to argue that the defendant should not have a similar right if he does not wish to be subject to jury trial.
	That has had the effect of overcoming my initial reluctance, because the more I think about it—and if I have to contemplate the fact that the Bill will one day be on the statute book—the more I believe that it becomes apparent to anyone looking at the mechanisms that this has been produced entirely for the benefit of the prosecutor. In a sense, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating because if defendants wish to rely on jury trial and the prosecutor does not ask for them to be deprived of it, they will doubtless not make the application in the first place. For those reasons, I take the view that new clause 9—or, for that matter, new clause 13—could provide a minor improvement to this very bad Bill, which I do not support in principle.
	I was rather struck by the fact that this matter was discussed by the Solicitor-General and me in Committee and that the Government were subsequently informed that if they were to move an amendment to allow this provision to happen, Conservative Members would not seek to stand in their way. Interestingly, the Government turned down the opportunity. In a letter to me and other members of the Committee, the Solicitor-General said:
	"Opposition members also raised the question whether defendants, as well as the prosecution, should be able to seek non-jury trial. There are strong arguments for allowing defendants to waive their right to trial with a jury, and indeed a general power of jury waiver was originally included in the 2003 Criminal Justice Bill, although this was subsequently removed following Opposition resistance. A case could certainly be made for a limited provision enabling defendants in serious and complex fraud cases to waive jury trial. The Government is not sure, however, that it would be appropriate to include such a provision in this particular Bill."
	The letter then went on to say that the Government had previously given assurances that all that they were trying to do was to allow the prosecution and no one else the opportunity to make such an application.
	I have to say that, to my mind, that paragraph gives a rather clear indication of the way in which the Government have been coming at this particular matter. First, the Solicitor-General appears in his letter to conflate the general resistance, which we saw in 2003, of allowing any defendant to make an application for trial without a jury, with the specific issue that we have to consider here. I want to make it absolutely clear that the two have no similarity whatever. I would resist to the bitter end any suggestion that defendants should be given a general power to elect trial without a jury. Indeed, we rehearsed that in 2003 and we made it quite clear then that it was probably a charter for the white collar defendant who wanted a sympathetic judge, rather than a jury that might take a robust view of his activities. For that reason, the general idea of the defendant having an option for trial without a jury does not commend itself to me at all.
	In this particular case, however, I have to say that I am swayed in my view. I shall listen carefully to what the Solicitor-General and, for that matter, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham have to say. As between new clauses 9 and 13, I have a preference for new clause 13, which should not present much difficulty to Members who want to support it.
	New clause 11, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, is of a different order. It seeks to introduce the principle that any decision not to have trial by jury should not
	"significantly disadvantage or otherwise prejudice a defendant".
	The issue of widening the scope of trial without a jury does not arise in this instance. The new clause would provide an extra safeguard, similar to the other safeguard that we attempted to introduce in the earlier group of amendments. If the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey were minded to press this new clause to a vote, I would have no hesitation in supporting it.
	The Solicitor-General said earlier that there would be no creep, in respect of the wedge in the door, once we had moved away from trial by jury in certain fraud cases on an application by the prosecution. However, these matters classically illustrate that that is very likely to happen. There would be a remorseless logic, once we started shifting away from jury trial in some cases, that would allow other people or groups to make similar applications. We cannot get away from that. The best thing that we could do with the Bill would be to vote it out on Third Reading. In the meantime, however, we have to live with the reality. There must be fairness, and as the Bill stands there will be a perception that it has been put together for the benefit and advantage of the prosecutor, and not of the defence.

Dominic Grieve: I apologise to the Solicitor-General for not reading out the full paragraph. It was not that I wished to avoid that section; I simply did not wish to be too long-winded, and it is quite a lengthy paragraph. I entirely accept that that is what the Government said. Indeed, I had understood that to be the position from previous discussions with the hon. and learned Gentleman. In 2003, the matter was hard fought out between this House and the other place, and various assurances were given at the time. It is commendable that the Government should honour them.
	Leaving aside the will and intention of the Solicitor-General for a moment, I would be interested to hear from him how it could be justified to give a prosecutor a right to make such an application, but not to give it to a defendant. That is the issue that new clauses 9 and 13 try to address. This is an important point and, as I have freely said to the Solicitor-General, it is one about which I feel quite uneasy. On the one hand, I wish to support the principle of jury trial. On the other hand, however, there is a logic—a slightly remorseless logic—that says that once we have given a prosecutor this right, it is unfair to a defendant not to give him the opportunity to make a similar application, should he wish to do so. That is the nub of this debate.
	It is true that the Government and we, as parliamentarians, can ignore that logic. The Minister might succeed in finding a way around it without difficulty. I shall wait to hear what he has to say. He might be able to stand in the way of that logic at the moment, but it will be brought back up at some point, and the same argument will be made. It is precisely for those reasons that I would have preferred not to see this legislation being presented to the House at all.

Douglas Hogg: I want to speak to new clauses 13 and 14, both of which I tabled. I also want to comment on new clause 11 tabled by the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), although this is one of the cases in which he has nicked one of my amendments from Committee, so I have the intellectual property.
	I repeat what I have said on several occasions: I am thoroughly against the Bill. That said, we are also in the business of improving it. The fact that we are arguing for changes to the Bill to extend the range of cases that can attract a non-jury trial should not be used to argue that we favour the Bill.
	New clause 11, in which I have the intellectual property, is admirable. It is designed to ensure that a judge who considers an application for a non-jury trial should be in a position to refuse that application if he or she concludes that the non-jury trial order would significantly prejudice the interests of the defendant. That seems to me to be a clear test, which is in accordance with natural justice and which I strongly commend to the House. Being as dispassionate as possible, I cannot identify a decent argument against it, save the argument of my friend the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews), who asserts repeatedly that the Bill is so bad that we should have nothing to do with it. I will certainly support the new clause if it is pressed to a vote.
	On new clauses 13 and 14, the question is whether, given that the Crown can make an application for a non-jury trial, the same right should be given to the defendant. I have practised law, off and on, for 40 years or thereabouts. The assertion that one should give to the Crown the sole right to make an application of such profound consequence to the conduct of a trial, and deny it to the defendant, seems to me to be manifestly unfair. I can identify no principle on which someone who asserts that proposition could stand. The argument of parity of arms, equality of position and plain fairness points irresistibly in the direction of giving the defendant the same right as that given to the Crown.
	Were the Solicitor General to accept this or a similar proposal, while we would denounce the Bill and the process, I would not accuse him of pushing the wedge into the wood, as I know that we are pushing the wedge into the wood. It would be dishonest of me to criticise him on that narrow ground, and I promise that I would not do so. I do not suppose for a moment that my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) or the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey would do so, as we know that we are pushing the Government on this point.
	Leaving aside the issue of whether the proposal is right in principle, the question also arises as to whether there are cases in which the defendant is likely to want to make such an application. We must consider that for two reasons. First, of course, we must consider whether the general right should be incorporated into the Bill. Secondly, if the answer is that it should, we must prescribe the criteria. The criteria on which the defendant will seek to make an application are not the same as those on which the Crown will seek to make an application; they are different, and probably different in kind. Therefore, I have tried to set out in new clause 14(5) the broad test that a defendant would have to satisfy to procure a non-jury trial order.
	I suggest that there are at least five cases—doubtless there are others—in which a defendant might wish to make such an application. The hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey identified two. The first, which I ventured to mention earlier, is cost. Increasingly, defendants will be paying their own costs. I do not particularly object to that in proper cases. Even when the legal aid fund pays the costs, the defendant can incur substantial losses through loss of employment or the fact that he or she cannot earn his or her income. In some cases a non-jury trial is likely to be shorter than a jury trial, and for that quite narrow reason a defendant might want a non-jury trial. It is a perfectly good reason, and one that should be available to defendants.
	Secondly, I can contemplate a number of classes of case that a defendant might prefer to be tried by a judge alone. Defrauding of pensions is an example, in a climate in which people are very sensitive about their pension rights. If the allegation against the defendant was conspiracy to defraud a pension fund, for example, I can imagine the defendant being rather uneasy about leaving that question in the hands of a jury, given the background of which the House is now aware.
	Let me give another example that is less flattering to ourselves, and cite the class of the defendant. Let us assume that politicians are among the least popular class of individuals. Would a politician—perhaps a high-profile politician—necessarily want to leave his or her case in the hands of a jury? In libel cases, the answer is sometimes no, and what is true of libel cases may well be true of criminal cases. A fairly unattractive politician—or just a politician—might reckon that he would have a fairer trial at the hands of a judge alone than at the hands of judge and jury.

Bob Neill: I strongly agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. Does he agree that his point about costs would be greatly reinforced if the Government—as appears will be the case—were to adopt the Carter recommendations in respect of legal aid and put a cap on expenditure in high-cost fraud cases that are subject to legal aid? That would put legally aided defendants in such cases in an invidious position in relation to costs. Therefore, the Government's proposals could aggravate the problem that my right hon. and learned Friend rightly identifies.

Mike O'Brien: I might have saved the hon. Gentleman the trouble of intervening if I had made the point that I was about to make, which is that the Government have not changed their mind about the general principle. It sounds as though some Opposition Members have not changed their minds about it, either, but that they see that there might be cause for making a change in particular, narrow cases.
	A case could certainly be made for a more limited provision that would enable defendants only in serious and complex fraud cases to waive jury trial, and we have given some real thought to that possibility. The provision that we were considering would, like that in the 2003 Bill, have given defendants a right to non-jury trial, subject to veto by a co-defendant who wanted to be tried by jury. We doubt whether it would be practical to require a defendant, as the prosecution must, to satisfy any condition in order to secure non-jury trial, along the lines proposed in new clause 14(5). Our view was that, if jury waiver is to be available, it probably ought to be available on request. For example, if, in order to make the application, the defence had to show in detail that the exposition of its defence was likely to result in a long and complex trial—rather than the evidence being put forward by the prosecution—it might have to expose all the detail and complexity of its argument. If we were to go down this route, a better way to proceed would probably be to give the defence a right to make the application, rather than circumscribing it with various conditions.
	Having said all that, although I am not disputing the many points that have been made during the debate, there is one issue that weighed quite heavily with me. When we introduced the Bill, we made it clear that we wanted it to deal with an area of law that had a long and particular history relating to Auld and Roskill, and that we did not regard it as a wedge that could be extended to a series of other non-jury trials. I accept that the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) would say that he would not seek to use against me an allegation of bad faith if I responded to the Opposition's request. However, I note that he subsequently went on to argue, despite saying that he would not do so, that there is an inevitable logic in extending the provision once we have got it. He was saying, in effect, that if we accepted the Opposition's position, we would be accepting the inevitable logic of the provision's being extended to other areas. He used that argument honestly—I am not implying any other motive—but I point out to him that there is a way of not extending that provision, which is to take the view that one will not do so. Indeed, we have given that commitment.
	In discussions with the Opposition about introducing such a Bill, we gave various commitments and we have kept to them in good faith and with integrity. We and the Opposition disagree on the basic principle, and we are having that debate. It is important that, insofar as we can, we stick with the faith that we have had with the House that we will bring forward a Bill that deals only with the issue that was in the 2003 Act, that we will listen to the concerns of others and that we will have no further extension of non-jury trials.
	If we were to accept the new clause, there would probably—although not inevitably—be a certain number of further non-jury trials because a defendant had taken that option. I therefore took the view that we would not make this proposal.
	Would we ever consider the point again in the future? We have no plan to do so and we do not accept the wedge argument. It is a constitutional principle that no Parliament can bind a future Parliament, so we will have to see what happens in the future, but our position is that the Bill is what we want and this is where we stand.

Mike O'Brien: There are all sorts of pressures on poor old Ministers. That might be one of them, but Ministers also have to take a view about where they stand on an issue. I have done that, and the Home Office has done that, and this is where the Government stand. Another Government and other Ministers may take other views, but this is the position of this Government on this Bill.
	The premise underlying new clauses 11(2) and 14(2) is that an order for non-jury trial under section 43 might disadvantage or prejudice the defendant. The Government do not accept that non-jury trial is capable of having that effect. Proposed new subsection (3) of new clauses 9 and 11, and proposed new subsection (6) of new clause 14, amend section 43(7) of the 2003 Act. That requires the judge, in considering whether there are steps that he could take that would reduce the length or complexity of the trial, to disregard any step that might significantly disadvantage the prosecution. The amendments refer instead—or, in the case of new clause 14, in addition—to steps that would disadvantage the defendant. However, the judge is under no obligation to make an order under section 43, and he certainly need not take steps prejudicial to the defendant in order to justify refusing to order trial without a jury.
	New clause 10, which is the same as the new clause moved in Committee, and proposed new subsection (3) of new clause 14 would allow representations to be made in relation to an application under section 43. As hon. Members accepted in Committee, section 45 of the 2003 Act already does what we believe to be necessary. Section 45(2) provides that an application under section 43 must be determined at a preparatory hearing, which takes place orally. Section 45(3) provides that parties must be given an opportunity to make representations. If there is any ambiguity of interpretation, the Pepper  v. Hart provision means that judges will be able to look at what I as a Minister have said in this House.
	Proposed new subsection (3) of new clauses 10 and 14 both relate to representations made when the Lord Chief Justice—or the head of criminal justice, Sir Igor Judge—is called on to consider whether to approve a section 43 order. The Government do not consider it necessary to prompt the Lord Chief Justice or Sir Igor Judge to consider whether the parties have been given an opportunity to make representations, as proposed in new clause 10, or to consider whether they should be given the opportunity to do so before him, as proposed in new clause 14. We believe that such matters are best left for the senior judiciary to determine, as that is what they are there for.
	I anticipate that the process is likely to be that, after a full oral hearing for the initial application, the head of criminal justice will determine whether a further oral hearing is required. That would be entirely a matter for him, in all circumstances. Sometimes, that further hearing would not be needed, but sometimes it might. I make no commitment on that: we believe that the matter is best left for the senior judiciary to determine. The oral hearing will take place before the initial judge, and that is the best place for it.

Simon Hughes: I am grateful for the contributions on these new clauses. With your permission, Mr. Deputy Speaker, we intend to test the mood of the House in respect of new clauses 11 and 13.
	New clause 9 is different from new clause 13, as it would allow an application on the instigation of the defendant alone, whereas new clause 13 would allow equality of arms. Those of my colleagues at the other end of the Corridor who oppose the Bill believe that, if we are obliged to go ahead with it, then trials should be held without a jury only at the instigation of the defence, and not at the instigation of defence and prosecution. None of us wants to go down that road, but the equality argument—one of the central planks of this short debate—remains valid, despite what the Solicitor-General said to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). If there is a case for the prosecutor to go to the judge and say that the case should be heard by a judge alone rather than by a jury, I cannot see how justice is done if the defendant cannot also do so.
	To put it bluntly, there are two proposed alternatives. The first is that the defendant alone could make the application. I understand that the Government will resist that. The second is that there is equality of arms. I have not heard such a strong argument against that. The Government have said honestly that that was not where they were coming from, so that was not where they were. If, despite our opposition, the Bill receives a Third Reading and goes to the House of Lords for consideration, I hope that the Solicitor-General will reflect on whether at least that might be a step in a direction that made it more attractive—not that we would change our view on the substance of the Bill this year, but if the Bill were to become law in future.
	There is a difference in importance between new clause 10 and new clause 11. I understand what the Solicitor-General said about the other sections in the 2003 Act which deal with the procedure of putting to the judge in a preparatory hearing the case for both sides before the judge makes that decision. New clause 10 barely increases the strength of the right to do that. It would make a small adjustment. New clause 11, however, would make a significant adjustment to the proposition. It adds another safeguard. We absolutely do not want the Bill, but if we are to have it, there need to be safeguards: the interests of justice safeguard, the security of the verdict safeguard and the interests of the defendant or the prejudice to the defence safeguard. The new clause seeks to ensure that we retain the prejudice to the defendant safeguard.
	Finally, I turn to the matter that was referred to in the Government's consideration of the position. I do not believe that the Government argument that if one gave equality of arms, it would suddenly open up the debate, stands more than minimal investigation or consideration. Of course there would be the potential for more applications because both prosecution and defence would apply. Therefore there might be more trials of this type. The Government case is that this would be limited to serious fraud in any event, subject to the check of the judge and all the arguments, and then the check of the Lord Chief Justice or others, so there will be many checks down that road. In a way the Government have put their case on the basis of its being an experiment. For there to be an experiment, both sides need to have an equal opportunity to participate. That is not the case. It is a reason why the Bill should not proceed. If it does proceed, I hope that that is a reason why the House should support the new clauses.
	If I may, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
	 Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 13
	 — 
	Application by defendants for certain fraud cases to be conducted without a jury (No.2)

'In section 43(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44), after "prosecution", insert ", the defendant, or any of the defendants in cases where there is more than one defendant,"'.— [Mr. Hogg.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.
	 Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—
	 The House divided: Ayes 166, Noes 282.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendment Nos. 1 to 2.
	Amendment No. 15, in clause 2, page 1, line 16, at end insert
	'or a judge of the Crown Court who shall have been designated by the Lord Chief Justice or by a judge nominated by him to try the case.'.
	Government amendments Nos. 3 to 6.

Dominic Grieve: This is my last attempt in what has been a long process to tempt the Government to take an alternative course of action in the Bill. New clause 15 is drafted simply, and it provides a mechanism so that the prosecution can apply for trials to take place without a jury. The Solicitor-General will know that since the matter first arose in 2003 I have suggested that the Government consider the alternative of special juries if they were worried that the burden would be too great for people summoned off the street to serve on a jury panel and if they feared that those jurors would not be able to cope with a lengthy trial.
	I suggested that a panel might be set up, drawn from organisations such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants, the Society of Actuaries and other persons who clearly had a knowledge of financial documents. The panel could be called upon to form special juries when they were necessary in long and complex fraud cases. The scheme would have the added advantage that those who served on such a panel might well have taken early retirement, would have the sagacity, wisdom and time to do the work, and would be willing to do it. The task would be a public service that offered them fulfilment and interest. I never succeeded in selling the idea to the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General, which I regret.
	The problem that I face with the Bill as it stands is that the title states in rather redolent terms and, I am sure, quite deliberately, "Fraud (Trials without a Jury) Bill", with the consequence that any attempt to introduce in the Bill a special jury is immediately met with the argument that it is out of order because on Second Reading we decided not to have juries.

Dominic Grieve: Let me briefly recap what has happened since 2003. I shall try not to take too long. An assurance was given in 2003, as the right hon. Gentleman will recollect, that the provisions of section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which could not be implemented without a resolution of both Houses of Parliament, would not be brought in, and that the Government would look to bring in further primary legislation and would carry out consultations before they did so.
	The right hon. Gentleman may also be aware that there is considerable disagreement between the Opposition and the Government as to whether consultation ever took place. The Government's understanding of the consultation was a one morning-long seminar to which people were invited without appreciating that that was the only formal consultation that would take place. I was unable to attend. My noble Friend Lord Kingsland attended and was not aware when he was there that that was the consultation. Other people also attended, I think.
	That was not a productive process. The Government then announced that they would proceed by trying to get the affirmative resolutions on section 43. When they tried to do that, the Lords indicated that that was in breach of the undertakings given in 2003 and that they would not go along with it. Following that, negotiations took place. I put it on record that the Attorney-General held meetings on two occasions with myself and other hon. Members, and that we had the opportunity to discuss in his chambers in Buckingham Palace Gate the issues surrounding the options, but without the wider consultation that I expected as a result of the assurances given in 2003 by the then Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett).
	I suggested at that stage that one possible way forward was the special jury system. Although there are drawbacks, I would find that an acceptable solution if it met the Government's anxieties. I regret the fact that the Government have never been able to be tempted, so all I can do at this stage of the Bill is to see whether there are any other solutions that might tempt them.
	That is what new clause 15 seeks to do. It would provide for a panel of experts drawn from the Institute of Chartered Accountants, the Society of Actuaries or
	"other persons prescribed by regulations made by the Lord Chancellor".
	The measure's title would be changed to "Fraud (Trials without a Jury but with a Panel of Experts) Bill."
	There is a difference between a panel of experts and a jury. The panel of experts would have exclusive right to determine the facts. To get round the problem that if it retires without the judge it becomes a jury, I included the concession that the judge should retire with it. I am not sure what the judge will do when he retires with the experts, but he could advise them on the law, which would be practical, and remind them of any salient facts. However, he could not determine any factual matter in the case of a disagreement.
	That gives me an opportunity to resurrect, even at the 11th hour, the principle of not following the route that the Government have chosen. If the Government gave even the smallest positive sign that the alternative that I have suggested would commend itself, we might make some progress rather than reaching the position whereby the Bill does not get through the upper House and may have to be pushed through under the Parliament Act. That is undesirable on a matter about which we should attempt to achieve some consensus.

Dominic Grieve: We considered the matter in Committee. Indeed, we discussed the problem that would arise with trial by judge alone if various applications were made to the judge on matters of law, which might mean his being told facts that would not otherwise be placed before him. The Government's attitude was fairly dismissive. They claimed that trained judges can put out of their mind what is irrelevant to their determination of matters of fact. The Government are satisfied that that will happen. I do not have that confidence. I profoundly believe that the system whereby judge and jury have separate roles in criminal justice in the Crown court is important. New clause 15 would go some way towards solving the problem because the judge could still deal with points of law but have no role in determining questions of fact.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: I appreciate that the question would be better directed to the Solicitor-General and I shall attempt to do that in due course. However, given that I did not serve on the Committee, I should be grateful for some guidance. How can the measure deal with articles 6 and 12 of the European convention on human rights? When a case goes to Europe, how could the measure deal with the defence argument of, "I was addressing a judge when he, with the prosecution, was privy to factual matters and allegations of which I had no knowledge"? The Bill would not have a prayer in a European court. How did the Committee consider that?

Dominic Grieve: The matter was discussed in Committee but the hon. and learned Gentleman would do better to direct his questions to the Solicitor-General. Anxiety was expressed about mixing the role of the judge as guardian of the process with his having to make findings of fact. We went into the process whereby judgments would be given in detail. However, much remained obscure to me. If the Solicitor-General can respond to the matters that the hon. and learned Gentleman raised, I should be grateful. We did not consider the minutiae of some of the issues that were likely to arise, although my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), among others, referred to them.
	I do not want to take up more of the House's time on new clause 15. It is an alternative that, I am sure, contains many flaws within it, but I have to say that if I were offered the choice between the new clause and the Government's preferred option—and they were the only two options available—I would opt for the new clause. It would preserve public confidence in the idea that the decision of innocence or guilt should be made by an independent group of people and not by a judge. I have always believed that that is one of the most profoundly important aspects of the criminal justice system that we possess today. I do not wish to see it eroded.
	Briefly, Government amendment No. 1 is designed to provide that a trial by judge alone can be conducted by
	"a judge of the Crown Court nominated for the purposes of that section by the Head of Criminal Justice".
	Because I have had an opportunity to talk to the Solicitor-General about it previously, I understand the reasons why the Government amendment was tabled. The straightforward argument is that there are not enough High Court judges to do this work, which will be long and onerous, and that some Crown court judges might be capable of sitting alone as judges in long trials.
	I have two objections to that. First, my experience suggests that few Crown court judges are capable of sitting as judges alone—certainly not without extensive training. The vast majority of Crown court judges, particularly those with the heaviest work load, tend to come from a background of criminal advocacy—and very good at it they have become, too—and will not have had the experience of collating, marshalling and assembling factual material so as to be able to deliver judgments and manage the trial process. There may be exceptions—I am always prepared to accept that—but I do not think that there will be very many. Oddly enough, the exceptions are most likely to come—certainly in my experience of long fraud trials—from judges who also do civil work. Increasingly in my experience, however, that particular mix has become rarer rather than more common on the circuit benches. For those reasons, I have serious reservations about the proposal.
	Secondly, my reservations extend to a matter of principle. I found it slightly curious that in the course of our previous debate, the Solicitor-General said that any suggestion that the defence should be allowed to make an application for trial without a jury
	"could increase the number of non-jury trials and might leave us open to accusations of acting in bad faith."
	That is what he said in his letter to me. In actual fact, my recollection is that the assurance that a High Court judge would conduct the trial was one of the assurances given by the Government when they were trying to persuade both Houses of Parliament to accept their previous proposals—I see the Solicitor-General nodding—and for that reason alone, I would not be disposed to accept the Government amendment. I am conscious that it will be seen—particularly in the other place, I fear—as a breach of a previous undertaking. I am not quite sure how the Solicitor-General can reconcile this issue with what he said in respect of defendants applying for the right to trial without a jury.

Dominic Grieve: That is not the most persuasive argument that the Solicitor-General has ever put forward. He is absolutely right to say that the possibility was raised by the Opposition in Committee. It was debated and we tried to look objectively at its pros and cons. I also said in Committee that, while I appreciated that there was an argument in favour, it was a matter on which I wished to go away and reflect. The Solicitor-General will remember that he and I subsequently had a conversation, during which I explained that, having discussed the matter with my colleagues, particularly those in another place, I had come to the conclusion that I could not support the Government's course of action. As a result of that conversation, I was left with the distinct impression—I do not mean to suggest any kind of breach of good faith here—that the Solicitor-General would proceed with this measure only if there were agreement on all sides that it was the course of action to take.
	I was therefore slightly surprised, when I saw the Government amendments, that the matter on which I had suggested that we would support the Government—the right of a defendant to apply for a trial without a jury—had not been proceeded with, and that the Solicitor-General had decided to go ahead with the matter on which I had said that we could not support them, namely, that of allowing Crown Court judges to be nominated to hear the cases. I do not take issue with him on this; it is a decision for him, for the Law Officers and for the Government. It is clear, however, that the amendments represent a change from the previous assurance to try to bring people round to the Government's way of thinking. In that sense, what I said earlier was absolutely correct, as I am sure the Solicitor-General will agree.

Mike O'Brien: I do not dispute the history as the hon. Gentleman outlines it. However, having raised this matter in Committee, the Government took further soundings from the senior judiciary. Having done that, and having received an enthusiastic reaction to the proposal, I believe it was right and proper to respond by bringing the measure back before the House. During our conversations, the hon. Gentleman said that the Opposition—the Conservative Opposition, at least—in another place would not support this change. It was our initial wish that Crown court judges be allowed to carry out the trials. We listened to early representations from the Opposition on the matter back in July, and agreed to change the proposal. However, when the issue was again raised by the Opposition, we took the opportunity to take further soundings from the judiciary, and now we are back here where we are. This has been a fairly straightforward approach. I do not think that my integrity or that of hon. Gentleman is at stake over this, but the Government do wish to proceed with the amendment.

Douglas Hogg: I wish to say a few words about amendment No. 15, which stands in my name. It is similar in terms to Government amendment No. 1. I find myself very much in agreement with my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) on new clause 15, which makes me yet more regretful that I do not agree with him on the status of the judge.
	I entirely understand the arguments for confining these trials to a judge of the High Court; there is merit in that. It is true, however, that many Crown Court judges have extensive experience in fraud cases. I do not have the experience of fraud cases that the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) has, but I have been involved in two long fraud cases in recent years, both of which were conducted before a Crown court judge. One has only to keep in mind the nature of the cases going through the Old Bailey to recognise that many of its judges have substantial experience in long fraud cases. Some, of course, do not, and that is why a procedure for designation by the Lord Chief Justice or a High Court judge nominated by him as the designating judge should be allowed. I therefore conclude that we should not confine such trials to a High Court judge but extend the right to Crown court judges who are designated by the Lord Chief Justice.

Douglas Hogg: Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that many cases that are tried before Crown court judges are immensely difficult? I am thinking of long terrorist trials, difficult murder cases and rape cases that depend on complicated DNA evidence. It is wrong, is it not, to suggest that fraud cases are particularly and peculiarly difficult.

David Heath: That is a valid point—and as my hon. Friend said, it was made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). The number of judges who are used to trying both criminal and civil cases in Crown court is now extremely limited, so the argument that there is familiarity falls on that basis.
	We will oppose the Government's proposals on the extension of the use of Crown court judges. We also cannot accept the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, with its panel and, particularly, its curious arrangement that the judge will go into the jury room.

Mike O'Brien: I do not think that the senior judiciary should be involved in a controversial political debate about a Bill. It is not their role to take sides on a controversial political issue like this. I can say that we have discussed the issues. My right hon. Friend knows, because it is a matter of public record, that Lord Justice Auld—and before him, the Roskill report—set out a view, having considered in detail the concerns expressed about serious and complex fraud cases over several years by many sources, including judges and lawyers. Therefore, I shall openly avoid my right hon. Friend's question by saying that I do not want to put the senior judiciary into the position of taking a side on a controversial political issue like this. That is our job.
	However, it is appropriate for the senior judiciary to say that they would like to be able to manage in a particular way an issue on which this House has decided. I sought express consent from the president of the Queen's bench division and head of criminal justice, Lord Justice Sir Igor Judge, to indicate his view on the subject and he agreed that I could say that it was his wish that Government amendment No. 1 should form part of the Bill to enable the courts better to manage the process of dealing with non-jury trials.
	New clause 15, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), would have a similar effect to Government amendment No. 2, the main difference being that our amendment gives to the head of criminal justice a power to nominate or designate a Crown court judge. The new clause would confer the power on the Lord Chief Justice with a specific power of nomination. We consider, and the senior judiciary are confident, that the power is one that it is appropriate to give to the head of criminal justice. Therefore, our view is that the president of the Queen's bench division, the head of the criminal justice system—at present, Lord Justice Sir Igor Judge, and I take this opportunity to congratulate him on confirmation of his position as head of criminal justice yesterday—is the appropriate person to make this decision. It does not have to be the Lord Chief Justice and indeed his view is that he would prefer it to be the Head of Criminal Justice, who is the president of the Queen's bench division.
	The Government amendments were prompted by concern that clause 2 of the Bill might, in its present form, be too inflexible. Opposition Members spoke in Committee of the potential difficulty of finding High Court judges to deal with what, by definition, would be extremely long trials. They argued passionately that I should look at the matter, and I agreed to do so. Government amendment No. 1 is the result. I have spoken to the senior judiciary, who said that they were in favour of it.
	4.30 pm
	As I said, the number of possible candidates for non-jury trial under section 43 is small, at about half a dozen a year—an estimate based on the number of fraud trials in recent years that have lasted six months or more. Some of the cases in which a section 43 order is made would no doubt be assigned to a High Court judge in any event, but we believe that it makes sense, where possible, to assign very long and complex trials to judges of exceptional ability and appropriate experience. That is why we took up the proposal for a requirement that section 43 applications, and any ensuing trials, should be assigned to High Court judges. However, while some circuit judges are more than capable of dealing with such matters, others are not, and we believe that it is appropriate for the Lord Chief Justice and the head of criminal justice, the head of the Queen's bench division, to take a view as to which judges are suitable.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) asked whether the same judge who decided that a case should be dealt with under section 43 should be allowed to try that case. We envisage that the head of criminal justice would identify a judge to hear an application, and that if he decided that section 43 applied, that same judge would normally take the case through. However, circumstances might intervene—for example, the judge involved might die, fall ill, or be tied up in another case for a long time.
	Although I take the reasonable point put forward by my hon. and learned Friend that it would be better if the judge who makes the initial decision were to take the trial through, I do not want to include in the Bill restrictions on the discretion of the president of the Queen's bench division, who is the head of criminal justice. He ought to be the person to make the judgments involved.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: I do not want to embark on an amendment that will not make the cut, but it is obviously desirable that the judge who decides that a trial should be judge only should be the one to hear it. I can tell my hon. and learned Friend that a great deal of trouble would be caused if judges, and especially High Court judges, were to decide that a trial should be judge only and then left it to be heard by a Crown court judge who was not involved in the decision. Moreover, if the case changes and a defendant decides to plead guilty after previously pleading not guilty—and if that plea had been part of the original judge's contemplation when making the judge-only ruling—another judge will have a great deal of difficulty in unravelling the original judge's thinking.
	If the House of Lords can find a form of words that accommodates my hon. and learned Friend's natural wish not to trammel the discretion of the Lord Chief Justice, but which nonetheless provides for the exceptional circumstances that he has described, will he look on it with a certain amount of kindness, if not approbation?

Robert Marshall-Andrews: It would be helpful if my hon. and learned Friend would deal with PII. It causes great concern. How can it possibly be brought within the European convention that a judge sitting as judge of fact and law hears matter from the prosecution to which the defence is not privy and thereafter becomes a judge of fact? I am trying to be helpful, but I would have thought that a case in those circumstances would not stand a prayer within the European Court.

Mike O'Brien: I know that this concerns my hon. and learned Friend, so I shall deal with it at some length. The issue requires careful analysis. In much of Europe single judges or a tribunal will deal with cases. Indeed, in Northern Ireland we have Diplock courts.
	The Government are confident that existing public interest immunity procedures are fair and effective and do not in any way endanger the rights of defendants. Currently, both lay magistrates and district judges hear public interest immunity applications and go on to find on the facts. The same is true of Crown court judges, dealing with confiscation proceedings. We are confident that these procedures will work equally well when used in the course of an application under section 43.
	Doubts have been expressed about the impartiality of a judge who, having heard information prejudicial to the defendant, goes on to hear the facts. However, having detailed knowledge of this sort of information does not necessarily mean that the judge will automatically be considered prejudiced, as some of those raising objections seem to imply. Rather, the key question must be whether there are any ascertainable facts which would raise legitimate and objectively justified doubts about a judge's impartiality. I am not convinced in general that there are.
	The first point to note is that information prejudicial to the defendant is not likely to be the subject of a PII application in any event, but it is possible. Secondly, the judge is perfectly able to disregard any irrelevant information and may indeed be well used to doing so. In the case of R  v. H and C, the House of Lords made the following relevant observations:
	"If PII applications are confined, as they should be, to material which undermines the prosecution case or strengthens that of the defence, the bench will not be alerted to material damaging to the defendant. If it is, the principles which should govern the court's decision whether to recuse itself are the same as in the case of any other tribunal of fact, but the court's duty of continuing review ordinarily militates in favour of continuing the proceedings before the court which determines the PII application."
	In the recent—2005—case of R.  v. May and others, which involved carousel fraud, the Court of Appeal considered the fairness of proceedings where the same judge had dealt with PII applications in proceedings for conspiracy to cheat the Revenue and in later confiscation proceedings. The judge stated that in reaching his decisions in the confiscation proceedings, he had ignored any material that he had earlier decided attracted public interest immunity and should not be disclosed. The appellants argued that that was unfair and that the judge should have "recused" himself.
	The Court of Appeal rejected that argument and emphasised that it was perfectly possible for a judge in such a position to put prejudicial material out of his mind. As the Court of Appeal said:
	"That is a familiar process in judicial decision-making in this country. It is, to take only one example, a process which has to be gone through whenever this court has to consider an appeal both against conviction and against sentence: the court in preparing for the hearing may have seen material relevant to the sentence appeal which it must ignore for the purpose of the conviction appeal. It does so conscientiously."
	The Government do not accept that anything in the Bill will prevent defendants from getting a fair trial or lead to any breach of defendants' rights under the European convention. Indeed, I am pleased to note that when the Joint Committee on Human Rights considered those issues, it came down firmly on the Government's side.

Dominic Grieve: Despite the comments that the Solicitor-General has just made, I do not entirely share his confidence about dealing with either the difficulties that will be faced in respect of public interest immunity applications, or those that will be perceived in respect of judges trying issues of law and fact together in serious criminal cases.
	I want to return to new clause 15. The Solicitor-General will not be surprised to learn that I shall seek leave to withdraw it. I fully accept that the new clause and the concept of an expert panel have many shortcomings, but I regret that the Government are so implacably opposed to special juries, because although they, too, have drawbacks, they would be infinitely better than the course on which the Government are embarking, which is to get rid of juries altogether in select cases. For that reason I thought it right to find any creative means of bringing the argument back to the House at a time when the procedures of the House made it extremely difficult to do so.
	On the Government's position on trial by Crown Court judges, some Crown Court judges may be found suitable for such work—I shall forbear to list those who would be wholly unsuitable.
	I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
	 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Dominic Grieve: I shall be brief, as I am conscious that others wish to speak and that the Bill's Report stage is coming to an end.
	I entirely support the amendment of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg). It is wholly desirable that there should be a further opportunity for the House to use the affirmative procedure before this dreadful Bill is brought into effect. Losing the protection of the affirmative procedure is wholly undesirable. As a matter of principle and in view of my attitude towards the Bill generally, it would be a very good thing if the House were to support the amendment.

David Heath: We entirely support the amendment on two grounds: one pragmatic, and one principled. The pragmatic reason is that I will do absolutely anything that might frustrate the Government's intentions. This is yet another opportunity to do so. The reason for the pragmatic approach of wishing to frustrate the Government by any means possible is the principle of the retention of jury trial. That principle is not only right but is accepted widely in the country at large.
	Another principled reason for supporting the amendment relates to precisely what the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said: there would be no Criminal Justice Act 2003 were it not for the existence of section 330(5)(b), on commencement. It was solely on the basis of that agreement, reached in the room just behind the Speaker's Chair, by me and my hon. Friend the Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and his colleagues, and the then Home Secretary, that there was any possibility of the Criminal Justice Bill, as it then was, reaching the statute book. To rip up, in effect, that agreement in order to facilitate the passage of this appalling little Bill seems not only wrong in principle but an abnegation of that agreement. That is why the section should be retained. We should retain the opportunity to vote against this squalid process on every possible future occasion.

Joan Ryan: May I just make this point? The Government have kept faith with all the commitments that they made. Throughout the debate, we have heard mention of consultation and seminars. There has been a large amount of consultation over many years. Over decades, there have been repeated opportunities for broad consultation on the Auld report, the Roskill report and so on. As I said, the matter has been going on for decades. Professionals and the public have had ample opportunity to express their views over many years. Hon. Members were invited to a seminar by the Attorney-General, as they were promised they would be. We discussed the matter at great length in Committee. As my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General said in Committee, it beggars belief that hon. Members who attended that seminar had no idea of what was going on. We have had legislation and, as I said, we have had long and detailed debates on these issues. Members are invited to a seminar by the Attorney-General on the very issue that they have been involved in legislating on—and they do not know what they are doing there? I do not think that that is the case.

Joan Ryan: Let me just correct the hon. Gentleman. Exactly the same points were made in Committee, as he knows. In defence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett), what he actually said is:
	"I am prepared to give that undertaking. It is part of the agreement that we will retain the clause, but move forward towards looking"—
	as was said in Committee, the important word is "looking"—
	"at the alternative solutions that I have mentioned".—[ Official Report, 20 November 2003; Vol. 413, c. 1028.]
	We did indeed look long and hard at those solutions, as the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey knows, but it was clear that no consensus was forthcoming. An order came before the House, which was supported by a significant majority. It was quite clear that Members of the Opposition in the other place would not support it, so my noble Friend the Attorney-General made it absolutely clear that we would move on to introduce fresh legislation.

John Gummer: Given that there have been so many discussions over such a long time, why has the Minister not convinced a single person from any party other than her own that she is right? Surely that shows that the Government's argument does not have much force, and that the Bill is merely being pushed through by her party's majority—and not one of those people who will push it through happen to be sitting in the Chamber today.

Question accordingly negatived.
	 It being after Five o'clock, Madam Deputy Speaker  put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that hour.

Clause 2
	 — 
	Jurisdiction under section 43 of the criminal justice act 2003

Amendments proposed: Government No. 1, in page 1, line 9, at end insert
	', or a judge of the Crown Court nominated for the purposes of this section by the Head of Criminal Justice,'
	Government No. 2, in page 1, line 16, at end insert
	'or a judge of the Crown Court nominated for the purposes of that section by the Head of Criminal Justice'. .— [Mr. Mike O'Brien.]

Clause 3
	 — 
	Section 43 of the criminal justice act 2003: northern ireland

Amendments proposed: Government No. 3, in page 2, line 6, after 'cases)."', insert—
	'(2B) In section 43(2) for "the Head of Criminal Justice" substitute "the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland".'
	Government No. 4, in page 2, line 6, after 'cases)."', insert—
	'(2C) In section 43(4) for "the Lord Chief Justice" substitute "the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland".'
	Government No. 5, in page 2, line 6, after 'cases)."', insert—
	'(2D) Omit section 43(8).'.
	Government No. 6, in page 2, line 6, at end insert—
	'( ) After subsection (10) of that section insert—
	"(10A) In section 48(1) for "the Head of Criminal Justice" substitute "the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland".".'.— [Mr. Mike O'Brien.]
	 Question put, That the amendments be made:—
	 The House divided: Ayes 283, Noes 184.

Mike O'Brien: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
	The Government are committed to rebalancing the criminal justice system in favour of the law-abiding majority. The Bill enables the most serious and complex fraud trials to be heard by a judge alone to ensure that justice is done in those sorts of cases. A trial by a judge sitting alone will only be appropriate for a small number of cases—our estimate is about half a dozen cases each year. The maximum would be about 20, but we do not anticipate that we are likely to get close to that figure. To give us plenty of margin, and so as not to mislead anyone, that is the figure that we have considered. If we are able to have such trials, it will be possible to expose the full criminality of complex and serious fraud cases in court, and our criminal justice system will have the tools that it needs to deal properly with such major crime.
	The Bill is not a general attack on jurors. There is no wedge—this is not the thin end or any size of wedge. We are discussing a particular policy to deal with a particular issue. About 30,000 contested trials take place each year. The Bill is likely to affect half a dozen of them. In the magistrates court each day in our country, a district judge often decides verdicts, so no fundamental principle is being breached in the Bill.
	What is unique in this case is that there is a long history of reports by Lord Roskill, Lord Justice Auld and others calling for a new way of dealing with complex and serious fraud cases. No such reports have been produced about other areas of criminal law. The Bill is not a general attack on jurors; it deals with a specific issue in a way that is manageable for the courts and that ensures that justice is delivered.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend makes a very good point. There are strong indications that this Government do not like juries and lay magistrates and believe that the expert in the Government ultimately knows best. It is precisely because I disagree profoundly with that idea in matters of the administration of justice that I do not want the Bill to get on the statute book.
	The Government's arguments concerning the burdens on juries just do not hold up. The Jubilee line report and the interviews with jurors show clearly that, whatever those burdens may be—they are burdens that jurors have to carry in any major criminal trial—jurors are capable of doing the work. In so far as there may be a problem in that area, one of my regrets is that during the Bill's passage, we have been unable to look at any alternatives because its terms have been so tightly drawn. From Second Reading on, we had to consider only trials without juries. The jury system can be made to work, yet the Government constantly blinker themselves and ignore the improvements that can be made. They themselves have provided in future for the possibility of trial on specimen counts, with the judge determining the other counts thereafter, yet they failed totally to take that into account in bringing the Bill before the House.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend is quite right. All the evidence points that way; indeed, the interviews with the jurors after the Jubilee line case highlighted that issue. Often, these inefficiencies lie with the Crown Prosecution Service, not with the juries. The Government particularly demeaned themselves at the end of the Jubilee line trial, when they put it about in the press that the jury was at fault—a point that emerged clearly during the interviews with the jurors.
	There is no need for this legislation. We can continue with the present system, and if courts run themselves efficiently and there is proper trial management, jury trials can be made to work, as has already been shown by the Lord Chief Justice's protocols and guidelines on how such cases can be conducted. It simply is not good enough the Solicitor-General's saying that there are all sorts of cases that are never brought to court—cases that are never tried at all—because of the various difficulties and the burdens on the juries.
	History shows that juries will rise to the occasion. Through this Bill, the Government send out a dreadful message about the way in which they view participatory democracy in this country. For that reason, if that reason alone, I ask the House to reject the Bill on Third Reading.

Keith Vaz: May I first declare my interest as an employed barrister, although I have never practised in the area under discussion?
	I am sorry to say that the reason why we do not have sufficient time is that my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General spent 14 minutes of a 33-minute debate trying to justify a flawed Bill. I have sat through all the proceedings, but I have not heard a persuasive argument from him to justify what will happen if this Bill goes through. In reply to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), my hon. and learned Friend mentioned the senior judiciary, but then he backtracked and said that he could not quote them. Other than Ministers and their Parliamentary Private Secretaries, I cannot find a single person who is in favour of the Bill. Certainly I am not surprised that so many of my colleagues on the Back Benches have not come in to support the Government on this occasion.
	I shall not vote against the Government—[Hon. Members: "Go on."] No, but I will abstain. When removing the fundamental principle of trial by jury, which goes back to Magna Carta, one needs to be very careful. The Government need to reconsider the Bill. When it is defeated in the other place and comes back, they will have to think again.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General has not persuaded me on the issue of purpose or of cost, although the Government keep denying that the aim is to save money. He has not persuaded me with the argument that the proposal will affect only a few cases. If only a few cases will be affected, why on earth are we proceeding with a measure that will have fundamental consequences for the way in which we deliver justice in this country? I have been proud of what the Government have done over the past 10 years in modernising the justice system, and we have had some reforming Lord Chancellors, but this is a bad Bill.
	The Bill will make progress tonight, but I hope that in the time that it takes to go to the other place and come back my hon. and learned Friend will take the opportunity to reconsider it. I know that he is not driving it, because I did not see from him the passion that I have seen in his 15 years in the House on other issues, even other flawed Home Office Bills. He has pushed such Bills through the House with real passion, but he had no such passion about this Bill tonight.
	My hon. and learned Friend tells us that the Bill will affect only six fraud cases, but it would be the start of a process that could see the jury removed from other cases.

Simon Hughes: This is a four-clause Bill with one proposition. I hope that when the Division comes colleagues will realise that one cannot object to it by voting for it or abstaining. One can object to it only by opposing it.
	On 20 November 2003, the then Home Secretary said that, if this proposal did not achieve the agreement of both Houses, the process of finding an acceptable alternative that did not involve a single judge sitting alone would begin. However, this is not the Bill that the Government were looking for, because it does not contain that alternative mechanism.
	Liberal Democrat Members, like our colleagues in the Conservative party and some Labour Back Benchers, oppose the Bill. We have tried to improve it, although our purpose was not to amend it but to bury it. The right hon. Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz) gave some of the reasons why this is a bad Bill.
	First, given the argument about the burdensome nature of certain cases for juries, it cannot be claimed that the Bill will not be the thin of the wedge. Other long cases have just the same effect on jurors' lives. Secondly, although lawyers, judges, the police and the prosecuting authorities are entitled to support the Bill, this House has to balance other considerations. We are entitled to say that their case is not overwhelming. For example, the director of the Serious Fraud Office has said that prosecutions are sometimes not possible under the present jury system that could be held before a single judge. That suggests that jurors are not able to reach the right answer, and that more convictions could be obtained in judge-only trials. That is an unacceptable proposition, as it undermines the entire case for jury trials.
	Thirdly, the Solicitor-General keeps saying that the Government should not be misunderstood and that the Bill has been brought forward only because they want the full culpability and criminality of a case to be put before the court. If that is what we want, we must continue to improve the rules so that it can happen, and indeed many of the relevant rules have been changed in the past few months.
	Fourthly, we believe that it is important for the criminal justice process that the roles of judge and jury be separated. In serious cases that come before the senior criminal courts, the jury decides the facts and the judge decides the sentence. The SFO, the Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs have not said that they cannot do their work. In fact, they do it increasingly well, and we do not get huge numbers of failed prosecutions.
	Fifthly, the Solicitor-General says that the Bill will apply to about six cases a year only but, if that is true, it is not worth making this nonsensical change, as so few cases cannot be a huge burden on the criminal justice system. Sixthly, our present jury arrangements involve lay people at the highest level of the criminal justice system, and that is the most important guarantee that it retains public confidence. A move to having professionals alone deciding innocence and guilt will undermine that confidence. Moreover, successful appeals against judges' decisions will undermine the respectability of the judges' role.
	Seventhly, the evidence from the Jubilee line case is not that the jurors complained about the procedure. They understood exactly what was going on, and what they complained about was the prosecution and the management of the case.
	Finally, the Solicitor-General has said on previous occasions that lots of things have changed, with new orders introduced by the Lord Chief Justice, but they have been going for less than two years and are barely tried. In addition, the Fraud Act 2006 is still very new, as are some of the relevant recommendations that have been made. The system that is now in place is very new and untried: we should allow it to bed down properly.
	The Government's case for getting rid of jury trials does not improve with serial repetition. Lay juries are a fundamental guarantee that the public play a crucial part in the criminal justice process. More than ever, we need lay people to have confidence in our institutions. They may not trust us, or even the judges, by they do trust the juries.
	This Bill has no support among Labour Back Benchers and has secured no agreement across the House. It seeks to take away the right to jury trial, and it is being pushed through by a Labour Government who have been told no, no and no again.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: No. If my hon. Friend had spent more than 10 minutes in this debate, I would give way to him immediately.
	In the closing minutes of this debate I wish to point out that we have a right to be tried by jury in this country, but we also have a right to try. That is as much of a right. The Government are not simply giving up the right of people to be tried, but are conceding the right of professional judges to try our fellow citizens which has been with us for 800 years.
	Having said that I would give the Government the benefit of the doubt on the question of creep, wedge and slippery slope, in truth I do not concede it. This Government have a rotten record. They have terrible form for attacks on jury trial. They started completely unprovoked in 1998 with murder trial Bills and have continued throughout. We have gone through a black period in the political history of civil liberties in this country. Many of us hope that that black period is rapidly coming to an end. [Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."] If the epitaph is to be forcing this piece of illiberal legislation through Westminster by the use of the Parliament Act and, as has been emphasised, by the use of Members whose constituents will never be affected by it and who will continue to enjoy the benefits of jury trial, that will not only cost Parliament dear. When the Labour party goes again to the electorate, it will cost it dear.

Michael Penning: It is great honour to present a petition on behalf of the residents of Dacorum. My hon. Friend the Member for South-West Hertfordshire (Mr. Gauke), who is sitting on my right, represents some of the petitioners, too. The petition of the residents of Dacorum
	Declares that we are outraged by the decision of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) to restrict NHS prescriptions for Alzheimer's drugs. These treatments are proven to provide real benefits to thousands of people at all stages of Alzheimer's disease and cost just £2.50 per person per day.
	The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Secretary of State for Health to ensure that doctors continue to be able to prescribe Alzheimer's drugs treatments to patients who can benefit from them.
	And the Petitioners remain, etc.,
	 To lie upon the Table.

Derek Twigg: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Mitcham and Morden (Siobhain McDonagh) on securing the Adjournment debate. I am delighted that she is such a keen advocate of our cadets and I was pleased to hear her speak so highly of the tremendous benefits they offer our young people. As she acknowledges, the cadet forces are a genuine success story.
	With a membership of some 130,000, the cadets are one of the biggest youth organisations in this country today. They make a huge contribution to local communities and our nation's youth. I know that they are highly valued by my colleagues in the Department for Education and Skills, the Home Office and across Government.
	I should like to begin by setting out the structure of our cadet forces. That will help clarify the funding structure. In total, the Ministry of Defence sponsors four separate cadet forces. The vast majority of the funding we provide—some 89 per cent. of the total—goes to the three single service cadet forces: the Sea Cadet Corps, the Army Cadet Force and the Air Training Corps. Together, they account for 88,000 cadets and 24,000 volunteers.
	All three cadet forces are community based in more than 3,000 locations in towns and cities throughout the country. Indeed, in many small towns they are the most visible defence presence. There are plenty of opportunities for young people to join their local cadet force—including in my hon. Friend's constituency of Mitcham and Morden. Any boy or girl who wants to become a cadet in the Morden area can join any of the single service cadet forces. All are well represented in the area.
	The fourth cadet force, which receives 11 per cent. of total Ministry of Defence funding, is the combined cadet force. The CCF is based solely in schools and has a further 42,000 cadets with 2,000 volunteers. Today, the establishment of a CCF is open to any school prepared and able to support one. There are 253 CCF contingents based in schools around the country—currently 52 of them are in state schools, but as my hon. Friend knows, the figure will be increased by a further six schools through the new pilot schemes that we have announced.
	It may be useful if I explain some of the background. A school CCF can include sections that represent any or all the single services. Indeed, some include Royal Marine detachments. The school chooses the section, and the choice is often based on the preferences of the young people. Each CCF is a partnership between the individual school and the Ministry of Defence, with the head recommending officers and instructors from the school staff. The Ministry of Defence provides training, some equipment and administrative support. However, I stress that the commitment of the school, the pupils, and especially the teaching staff, are critical to the success of the CCF.
	The CCF had its origins in boarding schools because those children were not able to join community-based cadet forces. Given that most boarding schools were in the independent sector—although some were state schools—it followed that most CCFs were in independent schools.
	I want to make one crucial point, however. My hon. Friend suggested that the majority of Ministry of Defence funding goes to CCFs in those independent schools. That is not the case. In fact, the share of the cadet budget given to independent schools today represents only 9 per cent. of Ministry of Defence expenditure on all cadets throughout the country.
	Over the years, CCF units have spread beyond the boarding sector to include other state schools. We want to build on that success to give more children in the state sector the opportunity to benefit from membership of a CCF. That is why we announced a pilot scheme to expand CCF units in the state sector, in an initiative that the Treasury is funding to the tune of an additional £800,000.
	The first school to participate in the pilot, Haberdasher's Aske's in London, was announced last year. I announced four more schools in England and Wales earlier this month, and we aim to announce the final participant in the pilot—hopefully from Scotland—soon. Those schools were chosen from among those that applied for the scheme, and my hon. Friend may be aware that Bishopsford community school did not apply. I understand the points she made in her speech.
	In deciding which schools to select, we had to take into account a number of factors, including geographical spread, the facilities at the school and its capacity to provide the level of commitment from busy teachers and other staff to make the CCF work, as well as the availability of MOD personnel to help with staffing. It was a pretty stringent process—it had to be—and I am confident that the schools we have chosen will give the pilot scheme the best possible prospect of success. I can equally understand the disappointment of the schools and their supporters who were not included in the scheme.
	Our pilot scheme will run for three years, which will give us the opportunity to determine demand and our capacity to expand further. We will be working closely with these schools throughout the process, building strong and effective educational partnerships with each contingent and giving as much support as possible. In the meantime, we will also continue to keep in touch with those schools that expressed an interest in having a CCF, so that we can get a clear picture of the demand.

Derek Twigg: I clearly understand my hon. Friend's point. Obviously, we have to have the support of the school and the leadership within it as well as the staff. I will take her comments away with me and consider them in respect of any future schemes that we put forward or, indeed, of any other relevant developments that take place. I take her points on board.
	As I was saying, our pilot scheme will run for three years, which will give us the opportunity to determine demand—that is the important thing—and our capacity to expand in future. I was also saying that we will keep in touch with those schools and I would encourage any school that is applying to log on to the MOD website for further information.
	The cadets are a huge and diverse organisation. In fact, I think it is pretty fair to say that there is no such person as a "typical" cadet. What they do have in common is a huge range of opportunities to offer our young people to help them meet the challenges and realise their potential. The cadet forces are the largest operating authority for the Duke of Edinburgh award, and I am not sure that it is widely known that membership gives young people the opportunity to gain nationally recognised qualifications.
	The cadets, not just the combined cadet forces, are Edexcel's most successful partner in the delivery of the BTEC first diploma in public services, and more than 8,000 cadets have so far gained that qualification, which is not widely known. The BTEC is a vocational qualification equivalent to 4 GCSEs at A to C level. It is a qualification that can make a huge difference to a child's life chances, because without it, nearly half those children would have left school with fewer than five GCSEs. For others, the qualification is enough to provide a vital step-up into further education, or in some cases it has contributed to cadets getting into their university of choice.
	The curriculum is expanding all the time. A first diploma in the performing arts has recently been introduced and a BTEC engineering diploma and a team-leading certificate will be launched shortly. All those qualifications are provided at no cost to the cadets taking part. As I said before, we are committed to opening up those opportunities for our young people.
	The MOD is playing a key role in driving forward the Government youth agenda. We are working closely with the Youth Justice Board, for example, to explore ways in which the cadet forces can help young people at risk of offending. While the cadets are very much the flagship of the MOD youth agenda, we are also working with other Government Departments—most notably, the DFES—on a number of other initiatives such as the skill force programme, which helps to provide alternative training for young people at risk of exclusion.
	We are also working closely with the Home Office on helping vulnerable young people through the outreach programme and on an Army Cadet Force youth and community project, which helps socially disengaged young people to become responsible citizens. The success of the scheme has been independently evaluated by the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders, showing an 85 per cent. improvement in school attendance and community behaviour. These results are excellent. I should add that the Home Office's historically important funding of this project also makes an important contribution.
	These are exciting times for the cadet forces. Their potential and importance has been recognised across government, and they represent a success story that we want to carry forward. But let us not forget that this success owes much to a very special group of people: the adults who devote a huge amount of time and energy to running cadet forces up and down the country. Each and every one is deeply committed, and we are very grateful for the work they do, as it really does make a difference to the lives of so many young people.
	It is almost 150 years since the first cadet units were formed. I know that my hon. Friend and other hon. Members will agree that the cadet force continues to make a tremendous contribution to young people, their families and communities, and to society itself. I would urge all Members of the House to support their local cadet units, whatever uniform they wear.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Adjourned accordingly at twenty minutes to Seven o'clock.